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NAL FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1986

What if Soviet Silos Are Empty?

By SAM COHEN
and JOE DOUGLASS

In 1976, three years before the SALT II treaty was signed, Soviet Marshal of Aviation C.V. Zimin wrote: "It is especially important to observe intelligence satellites in order to take measures prohibiting their gathering intelligence."

What Mr. Zimin wrote stresses the most important tenet of Soviet nuclear doctrine, *surprise*. To achieve surprise the Soviets employ deception and disinformation techniques to mislead U.S. intelligence. They are aware of the basic physical limitations on surveillance from outside the U.S.S.R., such as from satellites, on which the U.S. banks almost totally to gather intelligence on Soviet nuclear-weapons systems and verify strategic-arms agreements such as SALT II. The Soviets work hard to make certain that the U.S. sees only what they want it to see and to hide that which they do not want it to see.

Never, since nuclear arms control negotiations began, have the Soviets provided the U.S. with essential data on their nuclear capabilities. (This led to an early impasse in the SALT I talks where, to "resolve" the problem, the U.S. declassified top-secret intelligence acquired through satellite reconnaissance and presented it to the Soviet delegation, which claimed to be oblivious to its own nuclear arsenal.) Rather, the Soviets always have chosen to accept U.S. estimates of their capabilities in consenting to arms-control agreements. This should have had the U.S. darkly suspicious from the very beginning, but it didn't because of the overriding political objectives for arms control in the U.S. government. As a consequence, in negotiations the U.S. has been playing a game whose rules have really been set by the Soviets. In such a game the U.S. could only lose, the question being: how badly? Only the Soviets can answer this question, and they are not about to.

Vital Intelligence Information

The basic flaw of SALT II is that the U.S. entered into the agreement largely in ignorance of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The U.S. assumed, for the sake of reaching agreement, that what the Soviets allowed the outside surveillance to see was mainly what actually existed.

The U.S. assumed that their ICBMs were being deployed in hardened silos, even though it was unable to verify this. Satellites can easily see silos being constructed and modified, but they cannot see missiles being lowered into them unless the Soviets choose to let them be seen. Even then, the U.S. never sees the missiles, which the Soviets don't want seen because this is vital intelligence information they don't want the U.S. to have. Instead, what is seen are canisters that the U.S. assumes contain missiles. In all probability, this may not be the case, for very sound military reasons—Soviet reasons.

When SALT II was being negotiated, U.S. strategic nuclear policy had been changed to stress military counterforce attacks, the highest priority target system being Soviet ICBMs. The U.S. informed the world, including the Soviets, that these were in silos. The compelling military logic for the Soviets, in such a case, would have been to base their missiles elsewhere, hidden from satellite surveillance, which readily can be accomplished, and which Nikita Khrushchev stated they were doing 25 years ago. That this unmistakably has happened has been brought home by flight tests a few years ago of a family of mobile ICBMs that the U.S. does not know how to find, follow or target. In light of this, one might reasonably ask, how can there ever be progress in SALT or START

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Let us pray they are right.*

when the very objects of the treaty are wholly elusive?

To enhance the success of such deception, the Soviets would want to conduct missile flight tests and reloading exercises from their silo fields, which the U.S. monitors with great precision. This they have done, enhancing their confidence in their missile-launching capabilities and enhancing the U.S.'s ill-advised confidence in outside monitoring. But considering that their silo fields would be a prime target for U.S. nuclear attack, why would the Soviets want to reload their silos, which would either be destroyed or be in areas of such radioactive rubble that reloading operations would be virtually impossible?

Those urging continued U.S. compliance with the terms of SALT II claim the Soviets have faithfully complied with specified ICBM limits by destroying old missiles as new ones enter the force. There is no evidence that the Soviets have been doing this, nor are they obliged to provide the U.S. with such evidence, because outside surveillance cannot verify such destruction any more than it can tell how many missiles the Soviets manufactured in the first place. If new silos are being built the Soviets are obliged to dismantle the old ones, which readily can be observed by U.S. satellites. However, such a game of compliance and verification most likely bears little relationship to actual Soviet ICBM deployments. Constructing new silos, presumably to accommodate new missiles, is dirt cheap in the U.S.S.R., where slave labor is used for such construction. The silos

Another claim made by SALT II backers is that U.S. discontinuance of the treaty will give the Soviets an excuse to produce ICBMs far above the limits set by the treaty. This presumably would force the U.S. to expand its own ICBM force, setting off an unbridled arms race. Such a claim implies that the U.S. knows two things about Soviet ICBMs: their numbers and their production rates. It knows neither, and can only assume it knows, so that it can continue the arms-control process. For all the U.S. knows, the Soviet ICBM force may already be at this feared level. But there is no way of telling. This is an uncertain threat the U.S. has to recognize and live with, but the best way of coping with this threat is not to mindlessly increase its own ICBM force. The best way, the logical way, is to move at the highest priority with the Strategic Defense Initiative: not only to be able to defend against Soviet ICBMs, but because there is no logical basis for increasing the U.S. ICBM force, in view of the gross uncertainty over where the Soviet missiles to be struck are located.

Needs Support

In 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan declared SALT II to be "fatally flawed." As president, however, he changed his politics and chose to keep the strategic arsenal within SALT II limits. He also chose to constrain the SDI program within the terms of the ABM treaty (from SALT I). But now he has let it be known that he no longer feels bound to base national security on treaties the Soviets regularly violate and instead will do what is required to maintain U.S. security. This has led his detractors to declare that he never was serious about arms control in the first place, as evidenced by the total lack of arms-control agreements during his presidency. Let us pray they are right.

On the other hand, if the president desires the support of the American people for these courageous decisions, and for his SDI program as well, he should level with the country, on the limits of our intelligence. "The truth hurts," it is said, and as painful as it might be to know how little we know about the Soviet nuclear threat, unless we accept this unhappy fact of life there will be no way to plan intelligently for our survival in the nuclear age. Such planning would have to involve a fundamental shift in U.S. nuclear policy, where the major emphasis would be on the defense of the U.S.—SDI, bomber defense, and civil defense.

The expectation the U.S. can survive the Soviet threat by attempting to contain, and even eliminate it through nuclear arms control is, to use the president's words, "fatally flawed."

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Pacific stirrings

by Colin Rubenstein and Peter Samuel, June 86

for The National Interest

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On meeting Australians. Americans often express interest in their country and say they'd love to visit. Most probably never will because, from the east coast at least, it is probably one of the most arduous and expensive air flights anywhere in the world. And it is not on the way to any place else.

But if the Australian region's remoteness deters tourists, it is not without strategic significance. The US Secretary of Defense learned this at an early age. As a first lieutenant in 1942, Caspar Weinberger was shipped off with the 41st Infantry Division to Australia, for it was from there that allied forces under General Douglas MacArthur mounted the long, costly war against Imperial Japan -- a war only ended by the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Remoteness provides strategic depth. One of the values to the west of remote places like Australia is that they provide a redoubt to which the forces of unprepared democracies can fall back and regroup for the counter-offensive against shock aggression. More specifically, the Pentagon has plans to make extensive use of Australia as a waystation, while supplying and transporting forces to the Persian Gulf (see Alva Bowen, Congressional Research Service paper 86-44F). From San Francisco US military airlift planes would fly to the Indian Ocean via Darwin in Northern Australia rather than via Clark Air Base in the Philippines because they would be too vulnerable on the northern route from Soviet fighters operating out of Vietnam. Similarly sealift ships carrying tanks, artillery and heavy munitions would travel south of Australia, rather than hazard the Malacca and other straits through the Indonesian islands. That could require the use of Australian harbors for refuelling and reprovisioning en route. In peacetime, the opportunity for US warships to visit Australian ports for reprovisioning and for rest and recreation is deemed extremely important in the maintenance of an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean and southwest Pacific.

US early warning stations in Australia

Australia plays an important role in maintaining the central strategic balance by hosting satellite ground stations in central Australia -- one, Pine Gap, is an important downlink and computer processing center for electronic intelligence gathered over the Soviet Union and China; the other, Nurrungar, is a transmission station for signals from US early warning satellites that monitor missile launches with a large infra-red sensor. Australia is on roughly the same global longitude as Siberia, which makes it a convenient place for ground links of geostationary satellites that watch the Soviet Union and provide instant intelligence on missile launches. Photo-reconnaissance satellites may also pass their data down through the central Australian stations, or 'joint facilities' as they are officially titled in recognition of their joint operation by American and Australian defense intelligence staffs. Such stations could technically be located in Guam or other Micronesian US islands, or for that matter in Thailand, but they would be more vulnerable to attack or jamming than in the deep 'dead heart' of central Australia.

American military power in southwest Asia presently rests precariously on quite small exposed bases -- Diego Garcia, Clark Air Base and Subic in the Philippines, and the islands of Guam and Hawaii. All are vulnerable to Pearl Harbor style shock attacks. In an age of precision-guided standoff weapons, plastic explosives, bottom crawling mini-submarines and other aids to powerful sneak attack, Pearl Harbor-scale damage can be accomplished without mobilizing carrier battle groups and hundreds of warplanes as in 1941. They might even be able to be passed off as the work of shadowy terrorist groups. In any case western interests in Asia and the Pacific are importantly bolstered by the availability of relatively secure facilities and fallback possibilities in Australia.

Antipodean people's bureaux

Until recently the general Pacific region was among the most hospitable in the world to western interests, but there have been disturbing stirrings lately. Also, it is a measure of the global perspective of America's enemies that they are increasingly active in the remote south Pacific. The Cubans have opened embassies and are sponsoring 'exchanges'. The Libyans are training New Caledonian revolutionaries and opening antipodean 'people's bureaux'. The Vietnamese are running clinics. And the Soviets are recruiting student and trade union leaders, running cruise ships and fishing fleets, and buying port access and entree for their personnel with 'economic agreements' with the governments of the island mini-states. At least as important in the radicalization of the south Pacific are links with a diverse collection of extreme leftist organizations in western countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the US. As Paul Seabury has written ("Quadrant" March 1986) the main Soviet proxies so far have been westerners "alienated from the fundamental values of the free world" -- Greenpeace radicals, liberation theology clerics, communist trade union and youth leaders from Australia and so forth. Given their skills in political mobilization (subversion, if you will), a combination of the Soviets and their friends can use such footholds to contrive or build local grievances, so some of these states can be moved right into the Soviet orbit. An 'anti-nuclear' movement of considerable breadth and zeal is already a major threat to western interests throughout the south Pacific. All the governments there subscribe to various kinds of 'nuclear free' policy. This is an example of how an ostensibly evenhanded or ideologically neutral movement can have an unbalanced or unilateral effect. The south Pacific is presently of considerable importance in maintaining the western nuclear deterrent. The French have their only nuclear testing center at Mururoa Atoll in Polynesia, so the Force de Frappe depends on continued tests there. The US has a missile splashdown site and monitoring facility at Kwajalein island in Micronesia. It has defense obligations under the ANZUS Alliance to Australia (and formally to New Zealand too, though these are in jeopardy). These US obligations can only be fulfilled by US warship visits and joint naval exercising -- which have to involve ships that carry nuclear weapons and propulsion, since the US Navy is a nuclear Navy. As Paul Wolfowitz, when Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, put the matter bluntly in testimony to a Congressional Committee: "We have only one Navy -- not one conventionally capable navy and one nuclear-capable navy; not one navy to accommodate one country's policy and another navy for the rest of the world" (3/18/55, Committee on Foreign Affairs). So anti-nuclear policies inhibit US Navy operations in the region. The Soviets however are only just beginning to deploy warships in the South Pacific and in any case are far more able to exploit duplicity to serve their purposes than the US. An American Government, burned by affairs such as Watergate, vigilantly policed by a skeptical Congress and media and inhibited by ethical considerations, finds official lying awkward. The Soviets however can lie with far less difficulty. They presently declare with impressive chutzpah that they greatly respect and faithfully abide by the South Pacific nuclear free policies, while quietly continuing to sail the region with ammunition magazines uninspected and therefore certainly containing the same nuclear warheads carried everywhere else in the world. US warships on the other hand have to respond to anti-nuclear questions with evasive circumlocutions about how they 'cannot confirm or deny' the presence of nuclear weapons.

Unfair competition in duplicity

The anti-nuclear movement suits the Soviet purpose well because it allows the Soviets to seize what is seen -- in the absence of a vigorous and sustained political challenge -- as the moral high ground, while seriously inhibiting US naval operations. So the anti-nuclear movement moves the balance of military power the Soviet way, while operating under the guise of political evenhandedness. In New Zealand, Prime Minister David Lange says contently that his Government's policies, that have racked the ANZUS alliance, are "anti-nuclear, not anti-American". Of course in a superficial legalistic sense that is true. They are formulated to

exclude all nuclear ships. But policies have to be judged and characterized, not by the words used to describe them, but by their effect. And the effect of 'anti-nuclear' actions like New Zealand's is obviously detrimental to US and western interests, and helpful to Soviet objectives. Mr Lange has a political party in which the dominant faction demands the country distance itself from America and an electorate that is substantially pro-American still. So he cannot get away with an overtly anti-American policy, though a surreptitiously anti-American one caters to his party's left.

There is a somewhat similar condition in Australia, with party factions and activist groups pulling a Labor government to the left, while the broader electorate wants maintenance of the US alliance. So in one ear you can hear the Australian Labor Government constantly professing its fidelity to the US alliance, proclaiming its evenhandedness and working frantically to maintain a public image of harmony with the American Government -- to satisfy the pro-American majority in the overall Australian voting public. At the very same time under pressure from the active anti-western factions working in the Labor party, the Australian Labor Government is adopting a range of positions damaging to western security interests -- strong support (including financial aid) to the Sandinista regime, agitation at the UN for an immediate comprehensive nuclear test ban, opposition to SDI and strategic modernization, closing options of US basing in Australia, a constant harping on the need for 'restraint' by the US and Israel in the face of terrorist outrages, and an agnostic position on politically sensitive issues like Soviet use of chemical warfare agents in southeast Asia and other Soviet arms control violations. So in the second ear, an Australian hears from his government a constant cacophony of denunciations of American policies.

Neutralspeak

Part of the cause -- and the effect -- of the Pacific political drift is the increasing use of neutralist language, and even Soviet terminology, by Pacific area government leaders. In the islands US non-recognition of local jurisdiction over tuna has fostered the marxist portrayal of America as specially 'exploitative' and 'free-booting', its public policies dictated by commercial interests. Even in Australia however there is almost universal talk of the "superpowers" and of an "arms race", terms which Mr Weinberger has rightly observed, misrepresent reality and weaken the west. The constant repetition by Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden of the term "superpowers" tends to bracket the Soviet Union and the United States together, and to imply that Australian interests lie with the smaller powers. The term "arms race" too, reinforces mistaken notions of moral equivalence, which undermine support for the alliance with the US. It suggests the US arms for the same reasons the Soviets arm, whereas as Mr Weinberger has pointed out (speech to International Democratic Union, November 1985) the Soviets arm for expansionist and aggressive purposes, whereas the US like other individualistic, hedonist democracies, arms only for self-defense. Also the idea of 'arms race' carries hidden policy prescriptions. It introduces the idea that restraint on our part will be matched by restraint on their side -- which flies in the face of the historical record and falsely suggests the Soviets are just a normal status-quo power, merely reactive to the US. Repeated in almost every official pronouncement on international affairs, this neutralist, pro-Soviet language has had a profoundly subversive effect on public discussion of foreign affairs in the region -- with the most manifest success in New Zealand.

Just some of the way with the USA

An upsurge of nationalisms is another factor in the region, encouraging constant demands for "independence" for independence's sake. To countries that feel dependent on the US this nationalism is easily turned into anti-Americanism. No Australian politician in modern times has been so ridiculed as Prime Minister Harold Holt after he declared during a visit to the US in 1966 that he was "all the way with LBJ". It was apparently just an exuberant, friendly adoption of one of President Johnson's campaign slogans, but Holt was ferociously derided from all sides in Australia for an expression of obsequiousness. In many quarters the measure

of a political leader's independent and national virtue is the extent to which he is prepared to distance himself from the US. In a recent speech (June 27 1986) the Australian Ambassador to the US complained that the Australian alliance relationship with the US has been "very much a subservient one" in the past but that Australians are no longer prepared to "adopt a supine or uncritical posture toward their major ally". The tone, only slightly harsher in New Zealand was nicely captured in a speech by PM Lange to a party conference meeting on May 9 1986. "We believe in a strong free independent New Zealand. We believe the world should not be the exclusive property of the nuclear powers... We are no longer a colony. We will not grovel before the French, bow to the Americans or genuflect to the British. Some of the Jeremiahs of the right were saying last year that if the government maintained its independent course, New Zealand would be reduced to a client state. That is exactly what we were before. We are not now and we will not be again. We are our own country now."

The Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, in his departure speech at the White House, after a meeting with President Reagan felt obliged by the domestic political pressures of nationalism and independence to say the following: "The close friendship between our two countries does not require identical views on every international issue. A mature relationship involves mutual respect for each other's right to determine independent policies." (4/17/86). Well, yes, up to a point. But the ANZUS Treaty emphasizes the unity of the partners, not their independence. A key introductory clause reads: "Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone..." There are limits to the extent to which any alliance can be stretched by "independent" policies and it can be argued the current Australian Labor Government is beginning to approach those limits.

When Australian Government leaders repeatedly denigrate the US supported 'contras' as murderous thugs and give financial aid to America's enemies in Nicaragua, describe the Strategic Defense Initiative as a dangerous delusion (Richard Butler, Australia's Ambassador for Disarmament, New York 11/14/85) that is spawning an arms race in space and destabilizing the strategic balance, demand an immediate test ban as advocated by the Soviets and opposed by the US, oppose MX and other aspects of US strategic modernization deemed by the US necessary to maintain deterrence, refuse to allow the US to use Australian facilities to monitor its missile tests, call for restraint (doing nothing) in response to terrorist acts and vote against the US nearly as often as with the US in the United Nations... then they are creating such a pattern of policy differences with the US that the very political legitimacy in Australia of the alliance is eroded.

US "paranoid" about Soviets

The Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (4/8/86) admitted a drift apart in strategic thinking between the US and Australia. "...we do not share your (American) strategic perceptions to the extent Administration officials would like... we share US concern about the expansion of Soviet influence, but clearly there are differences in our response... we are not complacent about the USSR, but neither are we paranoid." That suggestion that the US is "paranoid" about the Soviets is constantly reiterated in Australia and given the US preoccupation with Soviet political and military pressure, it is corrosive of the alliance.

There is an increasing tendency in Australia to discount the significance of the Soviets and to question the fundamental specifics of the alliance with the US, striking out almost promiscuously on independent relationships, all the while loudly proclaiming in generalities the health of the alliance. Repeated reaffirmations of the longstanding friendship between the two peoples, and the continuing importance of the alliance become empty platitudinizing, even hypocrisy, when combined with dissociation on one specific issue after another. The US-Australian alliance is in danger of dying the death of a thousand cuts, of being gradually nibbled to death, when the principal policies of the major partner are constantly attacked, the defense relationship circumscribed and limited, and future options foreclosed. Indeed it has

been suggested that the left in Australia has a 'salami strategy' to dismantle the alliance. Aware of general popular support, the left does not attack the alliance head on, but instead attacks its various specific component parts, one by one, taking the meat of the alliance away in small, hardly perceptible slices.

Obviously Australia should act independently on issues about which it has special knowledge and a special national interest. But many of the recent expressions of difference with the US involve neither. One example is Nicaragua, about which most Australians know little and care less, but about which Australian officials are prone to loudly and ignorantly berate the US. Another is the field of nuclear strategy, including US strategic modernization, SDI and nuclear weapons tests. In both cases Australian government leaders may be throwing political bones to the dogs on their left, as they sometimes privately explain it. Such opportunism overlooks the fact that Nicaragua and the strategic weapons issues are central to the anti-American left's long term political campaign to paint the US as the world imperialist, that bullies small, harmless countries and is the major danger to world peace and principal source of the arms race.

Peculiar literalism -- "Mate, it's not in the treaty"

Both the Australian and New Zealand Governments have contributed to the erosion of the alliance with the United States by a peculiar literalism. For example, Mr Lange at a formal press conference (11/25/85), answering a question about a US threat to withdraw its security guarantees to New Zealand -- no small matter one would have thought -- this prime minister played the literalist and said: "Well, they can't". He referred to the letter of the ANZUS Treaty to the effect that there is no specific provision in its text for the withdrawal of security guarantees. Mr Lange has also said frequently in defense of his nuclear warship exclusion policy that there is nothing in the treaty that specifically requires nuclear warship entry to New Zealand ports. As if a treaty between countries is analogous to a civil contract in Wanganui!

It is difficult to know whether Mr Lange is still playing the smart Alec debater (he loved schoolboy debating) in which case he is simply scoring a silly little point in a game of repartee, when he plays the literalist this way. Or whether he really has not grasped the difference between British contract law and international relations. In either case he seems to have a frivolous approach to his country's security treaty with the US.

The Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has a similar literalist streak to his thinking, though he does not take it to the same disruptive lengths as Mr Lange. Hayden frequently goes out of his way to distinguish between ANZUS Treaty relations with the US and non-ANZUS cooperation. In his most extensive speech on ANZUS (Fabian Society, Lorne, Victoria 5/5/85) the Australian Foreign Minister mentioned landing rights in northern Australia for US planes, port visits by US warships, purchases of US defense equipment, the US communications bases, and then said, "These facilities and benefits are not required ANZUS obligations". Now they are not spelled out exactly in the text of the Treaty as ANZUS obligations but they do come under its general heading of "efforts for collective defense" mentioned in the preamble to the treaty and could also be regarded as measures in Article II to "develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". They have all been established as working arrangements under the auspices of the ANZUS Treaty and become customary. It is an interesting question why the Australian Foreign Minister would want to emphasize the separateness of these working arrangements from the ANZUS Treaty, if it were not to suggest they might be abandoned without detriment to the alliance between the two countries. It is the same reasoning applied by Mr Lange in respect of the entry of nuclear warships to New Zealand ports. They are not in the text of the ANZUS Treaty, so they don't count -- Mr Lange has repeatedly claimed. Mr Hayden has at times introduced the same kind of literalist reasoning to undermine ANZUS in Australia.

US "Spinfisted"

Throughout the south Pacific, little municipal governments declare their jurisdictions "nuclear free", declarations likely to have about as much force as a city dealing with crime by declaring itself "crime free", or tropical islands protecting themselves from the extremes of the elements by erecting signs saying they are "hurricane free". But reflecting a major longstanding grassroots campaign, the "nuclear free" zone concept has more seriously extended up to national and regional levels of policy-making. Originating in New Zealand in the early 1970s, the idea of a nuclear free zone throughout the South Pacific was revived by the Hawke Labor Government in Australia in 1983, resulting in the signing by sixteen South Pacific Forum countries in August 1985 of the so called Raratonga Treaty, or South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. (Hence SPNFZT or "Spinfist" as the diplomats have dubbed it.) The treaty pledges the signatories to nuclear virginity in that none will acquire nuclear weapons, have them stationed on their territory, test them or dump any wastes at sea. At Australian insistence the SPNFZT treaty leaves it member countries to decide their own policies on the transit of nuclear weapons through their ports and Australian diplomats have told the US that its interests are protected by the details of the treaty. However SPNFZT is a major moral blow to western security, and closes future options. The treaty concedes the major themes being propagated by the anti-nuclear movement -- namely that nuclear weapons, even when carried for purely deterrent and second-use purposes alone, are bad, and that unilateral gestures are helpful to the cause of peace. The truth is different. Nuclear weapons like other inanimate objects are neither good nor bad -- they are bad when used to intimidate or destroy, but good when used to inhibit intimidation and destruction. The anti-nuclear movement seeks to destroy that vital distinction and to promote the idea of moral equivalence between nuclear deterrence and nuclear blackmail, as well as unilateral disarmament ideas.

SPNFZT embeds false moral ideas into the political discussion, undermines the legitimacy of an alliance with a nuclear partner and encourages further encroachment on western security arrangements. Take the issue of "transit" of nuclear weapons, left to individual SPNFZT signatories to decide. It leaves the Australian Government in a politically weak position. Its leftwing critics already say that transit of US weapons (in warships) breaches the "spirit" of the treaty. They take their cue from the Soviets themselves, who according to Tass welcomed the nuclear free zone in talks with an Australian led delegation of South Pacific countries. "The Soviet side pointed out the importance of ensuring that the treaty did create a genuine nuclear free zone. This pre-supposed a ban on the transit of nuclear weapons, including visits at ports and airfields there by foreign warships and aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard" (New Zealand Press Association, 2/5/86). Prime Minister Lange has done his bit to undermine continuance of US warship visits to Australia by saying that admission of nuclear ships on a regular and frequent basis to the ports of SPNFZT signatories would constitute illegal "stationing" of nuclear weapons.

Over time the present Australian position, favoring the nuclear free zone treaty, while continuing to allow nuclear transit to satisfy the US, is going to be increasingly hard to sustain. Constant citation of the "transit clause" in the treaty to justify US warship visits is going to seem like a shoddy legalistic quibble. As a matter of principle there is no difference between stationing of nuclear weapons and allowing their transit. If nuclear weapons are an undesirable menace when stationed, then they are also an undesirable menace in transit; on the other hand, if they are a necessary part of deterrence in transit, they may be in stationing too, and this should not be ruled out by any treaty. The Australian Government's attempt to draw a distinction is a diplomatic and political expediency that is logically and morally indefensible. It is therefore unsustainable and something eventually has got to give, SPNFZT or ANZUS.

Even as it stands, SPNFZT closes off important US options such as the stationing of nuclear capable forces in Australia or elsewhere in the south Pacific. There is no present US demand for such stationing, but why close off the option? If the large Philippine bases become

untenable, whether because of a leftward shift in Philippine Government policies, the power of communist insurgents, or the Soviet buildup in nearby Indo-China, then the US may want to find replacement, or supplementary nuclear weapons stores in more secure positions in Australia or the south Pacific. Nearly all US naval forces are nuclear capable and will not allow themselves, for sensible security reasons, to be subjected to any nuclear/non-nuclear admission test, but SPNFZT has institutionalized that barrier to US redeployment.

At some stage the US will have to face up to an Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) imbalance in Asia just as it was forced to react to a similar asymmetry in regional nuclear forces in Europe, lest its alliances unravel. In western Europe Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) were deployed after the Soviets fielded hundreds of SS-20s and other highly accurate and mobile regional nuclear forces. In the Pacific a similar threat of Soviet regional nuclear dominance is developing -- with SS-20s threatening near and medium distance Asian countries and new SS-25s being targeted on Australia. An American counter may not be landbased, as in Europe, but naval and air. Whatever the form of the US counter to the accumulating Soviet regional nuclear weapons, it is likely to require a diversification of basing and storage -- if it is not to be highly vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. SPNFZT is a major political obstacle to such moves.

Why the Antipodean drift left?

Responsibility for the Antipodean drift left can be generously spread around. Conservatives there have not done nearly well enough explaining the substance of the western alliance. They have usually mouthed lazy cliches about it in place of more precise and forceful language. They have not often really explained the need for western countries to work in concert to defend themselves. As memories of World War Two die with the passing generations, it becomes increasingly vital to carefully explain the danger of isolationism and disunity in the face of a totalitarian challenge.

Middle ground politicians like Robert Hawke in Australia have been too weak on foreign policy, on the defensive against the extreme left. Therefore they have found themselves being dragged slowly away from the American alliance, despite their personal predisposition to support it. Like the Democratic Party in the US, the Labor parties of Australia and New Zealand have been losing their Jackson wings. The extreme left has worked tenaciously and mobilized new segments of society. The churches have swung most dramatically leftward and in Australia are now almost without exception anti-defense and anti-alliance. In turn this Australian radicalization of the clergy has given 'liberation theology' a major push in the south Pacific and the Philippines. The labor unions have always been a communist party stronghold in Australia and New Zealand, and through the votes the unions are entitled to in the policymaking conferences of the Labor parties, communists are given a major say in Labor governments. 'Peace studies' are rampant in schools (see the book by Pat Jacobs "Operation Peace Studies", Rosa Research). The media, especially the taxpayer financed radio and TV of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation are left-liberal, and therefore far more concerned about supposed American villainies than about Soviet misdeeds around the world. As a result, an extraordinary number of Australians now believe that the US plays a major role in the arms race, that US "star wars" defenses are an American attempt to gain a first strike capability, that the CIA has been more deeply involved in manipulating Australian politics than the KGB, and so forth. Despite the prevalence of these beliefs, there is a broad based liking of Americans, popular feelings of affinity with American attitudes to life, and general popular support for the continuance of the alliance with the US. The problems are mainly with the elites and the opinion-makers, but unless these can be persuaded to adopt a more balanced worldview, they must eventually have an effect in eroding popular Australian support for the US and the whole concept of a western alliance.

Inspector Clouseau fumbles for Moscow

An indigenous pro-Soviet left, and the Soviets themselves, played a role in the leftward shift in New Zealand foreign policy, that has led to the confrontation over warship visits and the unravelling of security relationships with the US. In October 1966 the Soviet Union sponsored the establishment of the Socialist Unity Party (SUP) as a pliant political subsidiary, its key role being dramatized in 1980 when the Soviet Ambassador was caught personally handing over \$100,000 to one of its officials. The Ambassador was expelled, but the pro-Soviet party nonetheless managed to steadily expand its influence, where it matters most -- in the New Zealand labor movement, whose principal organ the New Zealand Federation of Labour, is now affiliated with the Soviet controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. Through the unions affiliated with the New Zealand Labour Party, the pro-Soviet elements exercise their influence on party policy, making it 'anti-nuclear' and anti-ANZUS. As early as 1982 the New Zealand Labour Party conference adopted a policy that New Zealand should initiate a withdrawal from ANZUS. The Labour Party parliamentarians were of course more cautious and moved to enforce only the more electorally popular anti-nuclear warship policies -- forcing the US to make the move to withdraw ANZUS arrangements. New Zealand's particular anti-nuclear virulence is at first sight surprising, since that country might be thought to be about the least likely place in the world to be in risk of nuclear devastation. (But then anti-semitism has sometimes been most fanatical in places virtually without Jews!) There were of course nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific, tests continued to this day deep underground, by the French at Mururoa Atoll. Nearly 3,000 miles from New Zealand, these tests have never released any dangerous radio-activity, yet they have provided a symbolic focus for two decades of protest politics, that in the end succeeded in radicalizing New Zealand's whole foreign policy. New Zealand's rather English brand of anti-French bigotry helped the protest campaign. The local view of the French as insensitive blunderers has now been reinforced by the Inspector Clouseau-like performance of the French secret service in sabotaging the Greenpeace protest boat last year in Auckland Harbor.

Perhaps another factor allowing the rapid radicalization of New Zealand foreign policy attitudes has been that it has largely missed out on the political education and personal contact with the larger nasty world out there that comes from absorbing hundreds of thousands, or millions, of refugees from totalitarianism. The USA, Canada, Australia, Britain, Israel and France have benefitted politically from great influxes of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Cubans, Indo-Chinese, all of whom can bring to life the otherwise usually leaden cliches of conservatives about the threats to freedom and the dangers of appeasement. Denis Warner in "Pacific Defence Reporter" (April 1986) writes that at a recent conference on Pacific security at a hotel in Honolulu, one of the most persuasive interventions in several days of talk by academics, journalists and military experts was a quite irregular impassioned intervention by a hotel waiter -- who happened to be a Bulgarian refugee and could no longer contain himself when he heard several delegates belittling the Soviet threat. New Zealand's restrictive immigration policies have not allowed in many Bulgarians! Also, New Zealand has never been threatened militarily, while even comparably remote Australia, was in fear of Japanese invasion in 1942. Darwin, Australia's northern city, was ruthlessly bombed by Japanese planes and small submarines penetrated Sydney Harbor, and ferocious fighting was needed in the highlands of Papua New Guinea to turn back what was seen, at the time, as an Australia-bound Japanese Army.

Bob and David

The personalities and backgrounds of the current Australian and New Zealand leaders are relevant. Mr Lange in his early 40s, and a small town attorney by profession, is politically a product of anti-American Vietnam protesting. He's a rally speaker who excels in clever point scoring and entertaining a political crowd. Essentially a very frivolous man Lange has had many positions on foreign policy issues, being a natural follower of the crowd. He specializes in catering to the predominant prejudice he finds among the activists and revels in the stage

that the prime ministership affords him. Mr Hawke is very different. Ten years older, he has had a very tough life, struggling personally with alcohol and problems at home, and politically with communists in the unions, and fanatical opposition from the left. He knows what the cold war is. Somewhat enigmatic like Reagan, Hawke has tough and soft sides to his character. He can show a confident and assertive exterior that makes him look like a leader, but he has proved more to be what Australians call a "numbers man" -- a politician who most often reacts to the activism of the factions in his party, deciding his policy position by the numbers he discerns in his parliamentary party caucus. A new term has been coined by Hawke critics in Australia: "Doing an MX". That means abandoning a stance in the face of internal criticism, for in February 1985 Mr Hawke did a flip-flop on MX missile testing. The US had asked that monitoring planes be allowed to refuel and use Australian facilities during the course of patrols watching the splashdown of extended range MX missile firings into the Tasman Sea. Mr Hawke agreed without fully consulting his Cabinet, but after a press leak and subsequent media and leftist campaign, he backed down and withdrew permission. Australians now ask whether Hawke will "do an MX" over US warship visits, over the satellite stations, or other aspects of the US alliance.

"No worries, no threats, mate"

A constant theme of politicians, observers and even defense professionals in the region is that it faces no threat. Mr Lange said exactly this, June 27 1986, in Manila as he emerged from a fruitless meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz. The New Zealand prime minister belittled the foreshadowed withdrawal of US security guarantees. The loss of a defence guarantee was "meaningless", said Lange, because New Zealand faced "no threats from anyone" (New York Times 6/28/86 pA-5). Lange has echoes elsewhere in the region, not least in Australia, where there is a nearly pervasive playing down of the significance of the Soviets. Even the generally conservative "Bulletin" magazine (7/16/85, p28) in its last comprehensive review of the state of the ANZUS alliance concluded: "There is no threat which the (ANZUS) alliance addresses. There is practically no Soviet interest in the region, and certainly no Soviet threat to Australia." The weekly newsmagazine published in subsequent issues no quarrel with this comforting assessment. Complacency about the 'lack of threat' leads directly to the idea that, while the alliance with the US is probably worth keeping 'just in case', it is of no urgency or foreseeable importance, and therefore is not in need of careful sustained nurture. Thus cliches of alliance fidelity are sufficient verbal treatment of the alliance in Australia, while the nuts and bolts of the relationship can be treated with a kind of casual pragmatism, in which the result is shaped by the political and diplomatic pressures of the moment. At one level there's a kind of escapism evident in much high level Australian thinking. The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Stuart Harris in one apparent attempt at a comprehensive review of Australian foreign policy managed to simply make no mention of the Soviet Union, while dwelling at length on the evils of apartheid. He summed up the professional diplomatic perspective on the world with the statement: "Our over-riding concern is the threat of nuclear war" (Department of Foreign Affairs Backgrounder #488). Such 'non-ideological approaches' completely abstract from the real world dynamics of international relations between communist and non-communist states in all their political and military complexity and focus on convenient villains without any local defenenders -- apartheid, nuclear weapons etc. Cheap and easy moral posturing becomes the defense policy, when the threats are apartheid and nuclear weapons!

Departments of defense usually see it as their job to argue the possibility of threats and the need for stronger forces, but not currently in Australia. Said a recent major official defense review: "Official strategic guidance indicates that we would receive at least ten year's warning of a substantial military threat (p1)... Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world (pvi)." Formally titled "Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, March 1986" and known colloquially as "The Dibb Report" after its author, Paul Dibb, a senior Australian defense intelligence officer, this important 176 page document was to plan Australia's future

defense force development "in the light of the strategic and financial planning guidance endorsed by the Government" (to quote its terms of reference).

According to Dobb "superpower conflict is most unlikely" because of the dangers of nuclear escalation. Soviet deterrence apparently is well assured. If Australia were judged, as Dobb judges it, one of the safest countries in the world, it might be considered possible to continue to plan the defense forces so they contributed mainly to the security of friends and allies. This way, threats could be kept far from Australia, and some credits built up with allies, just in case help were needed by Australia in the unforeseeable future. That, after all, has been the basis of Australian defense policy since it became a nation and the rationale for the commitment of Australian troops alongside those of Britain in World Wars I and II and the Confrontation in Borneo and alongside Americans in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Australian troops have regularly exercised with allied forces in order to prepare for joint allied operations. But swayed mainly by nationalistic political feelings and associated popular sloganeering about the need for Australian "independence" and "self-reliance", uninfluenced in any way by strategic analysis Dobb argues instead for severe curtailment of Australia's role in the western security alliance system.

Dobb simply asserts that "there is no need for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning. The presence of the joint facilities (the satellite stations), together with the access we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through Australia of B-52 bombers are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance" (p4). Despite the lack of any identifiable local threats, Australia's defense forces are to be reoriented from their proven and long-established role of contributing to collective security to defense of the landmass of Australia and an area of sea out to about 1,000 nautical miles, described without rationale as Australia's "area of direct military interest". Most of southeast Asia and the south Pacific are therefore defined as beyond the area for which Australian defense forces should be equipped and trained. A larger "sphere of primary strategic interest" is defined encompassing southeast Asia and the south Pacific, but confusingly, Australian forces are not to be designed to operate in it: "Developments here can affect our national security (but)... these are beyond the effective exercise of our military power... (and) our influence... must rest primarily with diplomatic efforts... our forces should not be specifically structured or equipped to undertake such tasks (here)..." (p4).

To be abandoned under the Dobb doctrine is the idea of Australia providing some western leadership in the wider southeast Asian or south Pacific area. To be scrapped is the existing modest but useful Australian role in the joint air defense arrangements in Singapore and Malaysia. To be foreclosed through more limited forces, equipment and training, will be intervention beyond the 1,000 nautical mile area of "direct military interest". Moreover the Dobb report -- warmly received by the Australian Government and uncritically gushed about in the media -- specifically says Australian forces should be developed without the capability for joint operations with allies. "There is no requirement for Australia to become involved in ANZUS contingency planning. Neither this possibility, nor other remote possibilities for calls of assistance under ANZUS should influence the structure and equipment of ADF (Australian defense forces)" (p47).

Despite the lack of identifiable threats, the Dobb report wants to tailor Australian defense forces specifically to cope with one narrow range of contingencies -- possible raids into the empty north of Australia, mounted from Indonesia. The Australian response is to be of a defensive, spoiling nature. For this the Australian army is to be composed of six battalions so three can protect Darwin, and one be allocated to each of three other northern settlements in a completely reactive fashion. The Navy is to be developed to operate only under cover of landbased fighter planes, reducing it to a coastal force, with major new emphasis on defensive mine-sweeping.

The report concludes that there is a need to "concentrate force structure priorities on our area of direct military interest" (p3) extending a maximum of 1,000 nautical miles. "Acquisition of any strike capabilities with ranges greatly in excess of 1,000 nautical miles

from our northern coast could not be justified. Air strike or naval interdiction capabilities that could contribute to our allies should NOT (my emphasis) be a force determinant" (p7).

Dibb's repeated recommendations that Australia NOT design forces for joint operation or assistance of the ANZUS partners flies in the face of Article II of the ANZUS Treaty which pledges the parties to mutual assistance to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". Dibb proposes a more systematic and serious break with the ANZUS treaty than New Zealand's no-nuclear-warships policy.

Australian R & R -- retreat and retrenchment

The Dibb report is the authoritative rationale to justify an isolationist retreat and a budgetary retrenchment of Australian defense. It says no replacement is needed for the aircraft carrier and fixed wing strike aircraft Australia has had during most of the postwar period. The 23 F-111 low level bombers that currently give Australia a useful long-range retaliatory strike force no longer need to be kept up to date and may be able to be scrapped -- if doctrine says no strike capability in excess of a thousand miles is needed. Airborne early warning planes and tanker aircraft are no longer needed. The fleet of thirteen destroyer/frigate class warships can be run down, and smaller, lower endurance vessels bought instead. Far less fleet replenishment capability is needed with the Australian navy designed for closer-to-home operations. If there is to be no intervention in support of allies, then the amphibious capability (presently seven capable vessels) can be disbanded.

And if Australia only needs to plan for lightly armed Indonesian raiders, as the Dibb report suggests, then the Australian army can do without most of its armor and heavy artillery. Leopard tanks and armored personnel vehicles and 155mm guns can be withdrawn, and an all arms force converted into a light airmobile infantry. All this is recommended by Dibb, obviously with political, emotional and budgetary rationales, not from any kind of strategic reasoning.

Against light Australian forces, the attacker would be able to enter Australia light. By guaranteeing an adversary that he will confront no heavy guns or armor, his logistic burdens will be greatly eased and he will much more readily contemplate invasion.

Australia although allowing the F-111 force to decline, will continue the planned acquisition of 75 F/A-18 aircraft to deploy from land bases solely -- though the planes were designed for US carrier operations. The 75 Australian F/A-18s are to provide air cover for the Australian navy. As a US Navy man recently commented of the F/A-18's range, "It is a great airplane, a great dogfighter, and reliable as hell. It just can't go anywhere" ("Armed Forces Journal", April 1986 p23).

By abandoning intervention and deep strike capabilities, these changes in Australia's defense force will radically narrow its tactical options, while eliminating an important element of western deterrence in the region. By making it doctrine, not to design forces for joint operations with allies, Australia is announcing its isolationist intentions, and declaring ahead of time that it won't help friends.

One of Australia's leading defense commentators, Michael O'Connor has said of the Dibb doctrine: "By restructuring our forces to fight (exclusively) from Australian bases... we (will) have signalled to all our friends (in the region) that their security is of no concern to us. Apart from the dubious morality of such a strategy, the strategic vacuum it creates in the region is potentially dangerous. Not only has Australia abandoned defense in depth; it has in effect invited others to fill the power vacuum... the whole concept of a fortress is to provide temporary refuge. A fortress commander who refuses the opportunity to dominate his surroundings or who voluntarily places his communications with the outside world at the mercy of his enemy is doomed to defeat. Australians cannot afford to retire into their fortress before the immediate region has been lost. Australia has a strategic zone which extends well beyond Australian claimed territory or waters. The abandonment without contest of that zone is to deny our defenders the classical strategic space in which to maneuver and the time to develop forces for defense of the last redoubt. Those who adopt the fortress mentality have in

fact conceded that Australia has no friends in the region. That seems to be a classic self-fulfilling prophecy" (page 29 "To Live in Peace: Australia's Defence Policy", Melbourne University Press 1985).

The Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley seems unable to come to grips with these points and apparently remains a strong advocate of the Dobb doctrine. But he is a politician, not a strategist. However the Minister has already acknowledged problems with the US alliance arising from the proposed radical redirection of Australian defense policy. Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, 5/8/86, the Defense Minister said: "There are possibilities for discord between our pursuit of self-reliance and our ally's efforts to maintain the thrust of general western alliance policies. I detect some concerns in the US about the direction of Australia's defense policy". Words like "isolationism" had been used by US officials, Beazley suggested, and though he rejected the characterization, the new thrust of Australian policy had led to "some ongoing awkwardness in our bilateral relationship".

Are fishing agreements just for fishing?

One of the most notable statements in the Dobb review is this: "Current strategic guidance identifies no likelihood of adverse effects on Australia's security from developments in the south Pacific in the next decade" (p49). 'Current strategic guidance' must be a euphemism for 'Australian Defence Department wishful thinking' where they apparently subscribe to a kind of happy Inverted Murphy's Law which says that 'Everything that can go right, will go right'. Only wishful thinking could dismiss the possibility that one or more of the south Pacific states will prove responsive to Soviet, Libyan or even fiercely anti-white political influences in the next decade and become host to forces hostile to Australia.

America's role in World War Two in ridding the Pacific of Imperial Japanese Army occupation forces laid the basis for a long period of affection for the US in the little island communities most of which have since become mini-states. After the cruelty of the Japanese, American decency and generosity were especially striking to Pacific islands people and so the US enjoyed such general goodwill that the Pacific was made a natural "American Lake". But the leaders conditioned by these 1940s events to view the United States as their natural friend are passing from the scene replaced by less friendly people -- many influenced by the adversarial culture of western universities, some caught up in liberation theology and propounding a kind of marxist christianity. The south Pacific has been one of the last areas of decolonization, and it is part of the third world now with uncertain political institutions -- it offers considerable scope for subversion. Outside the Australian Department of Defence, the chances must be rated rather high that of the sixteen or so mini-states, at least some may succumb to communist takeover along the lines of Grenada or the Seychelles.

The running sore in Pacific relations with the US has been conflicting laws governing tuna fishing. American law says that as migratory species, tuna are fair game for all, while most of the Pacific states have legislated to make them their property within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. There have been repeated clashes with American tuna boats, poaching according to local law. The US Government has retaliated with multiple penalties against Pacific island states. The Soviets have moved to exploit the fishing grievance against the US by dressing in bourgeois garb, telling the Pacific islanders how deeply they respect their property rights, and offering to negotiate fishing agreements with these states.

The first Soviet fishing agreement was with Kiribati, formerly the British Gilbert Islands. The Soviets have bought the right to bring their fishing fleets into 1.4 million square miles of the Kiribati islands economic zone for payment of about \$2 million a year. That now constitutes an eighth of the Kiribati budget, which makes them heavily dependent financially on the Soviets. Their military intelligence services are now conveniently placed to monitor US missile tests to the immediate north in the Marshall Islands where Kwajalein is located. Missiles fired from Vandenberg in California splashdown in the ocean north of Kiribati, where Soviet "fishing" vessels have local support. Some of these fishing vessels are well known to carry more antennas than trawling gear.

While Kiribati is purely a commercial fellow traveller with the Soviets, Vanuatu under the leadership of the radical New Zealand trained Anglican cleric, Father Walter Lini is increasingly aligned to Soviet foreign policy and the radical worldview. Lini declares the US as the great world terrorist and Libya's Colonel Qaddafi as its victim. He declined to join the SPNFZT anti-nuclear treaty specifically because it contained the Australian "out" allowing transit of US warships. The marxist Father is negotiating an agreement with the Soviets, which would give them not only fishing rights but port access. Vanuatu excluded US warships as part of its so-called anti-nuclear policy as far back as February 1982 (US Naval Proceedings May 1986 p149) but Father Lini seems quite likely to take the Soviets at their word if they publicly declare their Pacific fleet units 'nuclear free'. Vanuatu, population 120,000, is the former British/French condominium of New Hebrides and encloses the Coral Sea off Australia's northeast and the scene of some of the decisive naval battles of World War Two.

Barak Sope, Secretary-General of the ruling Vanuaaku Party in Vanuatu, shows signs of interest in the international terrorist network. He has sent people to Libya and visited Cuba, and Vanuatu already provides a base of operations for the anti-Indonesian OPM or Free Papua Movement and for the Kanak liberation forces from New Caledonia.

New Caledonia, still under French jurisdiction is the site of a sporadic civil war that has seen considerable violence and some Libyan involvement. The population is 44 percent indigenous Kanaks, 36 percent French and other European settlers, the remainder being Vietnamese and others. The indigenous Kanak plurality seems heavily in thrall to the radical Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS). It has declared independence and established a provisional Government of Kanaky. The Kanak radicals espouse a Melanesian racialism and deny the right of the majority non-indigenous population to citizenship rights. In 1985 about twenty people died in various clashes between armed FLNKS units and settlers and police. Two groups of Kanaks are known to have been to Libya for military/terrorist training and political radicalization. The French would have enough trouble preventing a mini-Algeria developing in New Caledonia, in the best of circumstances. The local French authorities are however handicapped by changing directives from Paris, as governments there change and terrible relations with Australia and New Zealand -- because of French nuclear testing and the Greenpeace sabotage.

Tuvalu, a collection of tiny islands between Vanuatu and Kiribati is also anti-nuclear and the subject of Soviet offers of money-for-access. America's tuna boat war has been most intense with the Solomons Islands that close the northern boundary of the Coral Sea, stretching westward from New Guinea almost to Vanuatu. The Solomons were the site of great island battles in World War Two such Guadalcanal, but because of the anti-nuclear policy and the tuna war, US warships can no longer use the harbor of Honiara. In one recent farcical *reductio ad absurdum* of the anti-nuclear policy, a proposed visit to the Solomons by a US diplomat was refused, when the US declined to confirm or deny -- when asked by the Solomons authorities whether the light Beechcraft commuter plane was nuclear armed! (Washington Times, 4/28/86)

The larger south Pacific island states of Fiji and Papua-New Guinea have been generally pro-western. However they do offer some scope for radicalization and/or Soviet penetration. Fiji is an awkwardly divided society of almost equally numerous indigenous Melanesian people and Indian settlers, the latter with most of the money but little by way of civil rights and political power -- somewhat like the position of Chinese in Malaysia. So far Fiji has been harmonious, but there are obvious grievances to be exploited. A more immediate prospect, even under the pro-western Prime Minister Ratu Mara is a Fijian fishing agreement with the Soviet Union. Ratu Mara announced recently (Fiji Sun, 6/20/86) that his government was negotiating a fishing agreement and that he had no objection to the Soviets getting port access for their ships. The Fijian Government recently lifted a ban on Soviet cruise ships coming to Fiji, imposed in 1981. With the most conservative government in the whole of the south Pacific allowing the Soviets in, they are likely to be able to make deals all over -- a major new breakthrough toward economic leverage and easier access for political and intelligence operatives to establish 'fraternal links' with potential local agents.

Papua-New Guinea, the former Australian trusteeship territory is heavily dependent on Canberra money and pursues a quiet foreign policy. It has periodically debated seeking security shelter under the umbrella of the ANZUS agreement. The Port Moresby government has however excluded US warships on anti-nuclear grounds and been difficult about B-52 transit rights, despite having some military training and supply links with the US. It has major domestic disunity problems deriving from its tribal factionalism and rugged terrain, rampant crime in the cities and economic underdevelopment. It has problems with Indonesia over their porous land border and the movement of dissidents back and forth.

Anti-nuclear policies are a factor too in the old American trusteeships of Micronesia, Palau, just east of the Philippines and a possible fallback base, has a no-nukes constitution. In the Federated States of Micronesia (the eastern part of which was the Caroline Islands) and in the northern Marianas, there are local anti-nuclear policies in effect, which have precluded visits by US warships (Naval Proceedings, May 1986). Only Guam, sovereign US territory, remains a politically secure base for US military operations.

Sweet talk and SS-18s, SS-25s, SS...

The Soviets have been blatant in their use of nuclear blackmail in the south Pacific region, constantly identifying facilities used by the US as nuclear targets to the local elites. For example during a visit to Australia in mid-March 1985, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa said publicly the Australian-US 'joint facilities' in Central Australia were on Soviet target lists for nuclear destruction and proposed the US military be removed from Australia and the government sign a 'pact of non-aggression' with the USSR. Crude stuff that has been rejected by the Australian electorate so far, but it generates surprisingly little local protest. The constant repetition of such Soviet proposals may be reinforcing the idea that it is the American alliance that constitutes the main threat to local wellbeing.

Arnold Beichman (Washington Times, 6/19/85) has outlined the details of how ten years of strenuous activism and political manipulation by Moscow line communists in the Pacific has helped produce the increasingly anti-American and neutralist atmosphere in the region. Effective use has been made of communist labor unions, church organizations and an array of front organizations. Australia was a principal base for efforts to radicalize the south Pacific. Former communist, now distinguished Australian journalist, Kenneth Gott often recalls that his very first assignment as an 18 year old member of the Communist Party of Australia was to courier money to Fijian union officials to engineer an airport strike. Jan Sejna, when a senior official in the Czech Communist Party in 1967 heard an influential Soviet view first hand from Boris Ponomarev, Director of the strategically vital International Information Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who said that Australia was to be the major base for gaining control of Asia and the south Pacific. As Sejna recalls Ponomarev's private words, the Soviet plan called for "exploitation of the extreme left of the Australian Labor Party, infiltration of the younger working class in the industrial areas, and of greatest importance, control of the trade (labor) unions" (quoted by B.A. Santamaria, "Newsweekly" 11/20/85). Actually, the pro-Soviet left has gone further in Australia through formerly 'bourgeois' elements such as school-teachers and churches than through industrial workers. Pro-Soviet elements maintain a political role mainly by manipulation and deception, rather than by gaining genuine mass support. In any case, Australia's role in regional political developments has been important, as Ponomarev suggested.

Red carriers coming

Soviet power in the region will depend on opportunistic exploitation of political openings, in the context of its steady accretion of military power. Already the Soviet Pacific Fleet, its largest, has grown impressively in numbers and capability. Since 1978, the Soviet Navy has deployed two aircraft carriers, when it had none before. It has increased its surface combatant warships from 67 to 98, its attack submarine force from 90 to 102, its navy bombers from 110 to 190, its amphibious warfare fleet from 9 to 23 and its logistic support and

miscellaneous craft from 420 to 475. It has a full division of naval infantry or marines in the Pacific and has begun amphibious landing exercises in Vietnam. In the mid Pacific it practices coordinated attacks on US carrier battlegroups.

The Soviet fleet has basing for 30 warships at Cam Ranh Bay and is building other air and naval base facilities in Cambodia and elsewhere in Vietnam, at least one large regional signals intelligence establishment, and surface to air missiles and fighter planes for defense. It has long range maritime patrol and attack aircraft there, which give it the ability to project increasing power into southeast Asia and the shipping lanes of the South China Sea. An indicator of the scale of the projected buildup is the estimate by the US CinCPAC command that the Soviets now have four times the berthing capability at Cam Ranh than the US Navy had -- despite the popular notion, they are simply making do with what they acquired as war booty from America after Vietnam fell (Admiral James Lyons, CinCPAC, speaking at US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 6/19/86).

According to Alvin Bernstein ("The National Interest", Number 3, Spring 1986), the latest major military push by the Soviets in the Pacific has been to deploy the new highly accurate SS-25 mobile intercontinental missiles in Siberia to target strategic bases in Australia. He thinks a major Soviet move in the near future may be the deployment of substantially more attack submarines from Cam Ranh Bay eventually to patrol sea lines of communications as far south as the Tasman Sea and the Great Australian Bight. By the mid-1990s the Soviet Navy will have considerable local intervention and tactical power projection capabilities, with the acquisition of full-sized carriers, deploying fixed wing tactical aircraft. Now abuilding in the Black Sea, these two nuclear aircraft carriers are most likely to be deployed in the Pacific and Indian oceans with the intention of helping change the "correlation of forces" in this region.

US policy

The US has not been able to pay much attention to the south Pacific in the past. While it could rely fully on Australia and New Zealand to represent western interests in the region, this relative neglect was simply a reflection of a sensible concentration of policy resources in other regions where they were more urgently needed. With the serious break with New Zealand, the Australian drift-away from the US, and the Soviet progress among the mini island states, it needs now to apply more political resources there.

Some of the recent US policy has been well-conducted. Once the crunch came with Wellington in early 1985 over its exclusion of US warships as part of its anti-nuclear policy, the firm American response was essential in order to contain the damage. If the US had acquiesced in New Zealand's act, then Australia would probably by now have followed suit. Mr Hawke and other middle ground Australian politicians have always had their left held in check by saying that the US will not stand having anti-nuclear policies imposed upon it, and that these would destroy the alliance with America. These Australian centrists have said to their leftists that to adopt policies threatening to the American alliance would be electoral suicide. "Want the lot of us thrown from office? Well force us to exclude the nuclear ships", they've said in party forums.

If the US had somehow found a way to accomodate Mr Lange's nuclear warship exclusion, then the middle ground position in Australia would have become completely untenable. Mr Hawke's left would have been able to say to him: "We can keep the trappings of the American alliance and keep the electorate quiet, and we can also have our anti-nuclear policy". With the alliance in general detached from the specifics of collaboration with the US, the left would proceed to peel away its substance layer by layer from the inside out. First would go the warship visits, then joint military planning and exercising, then intelligence exchange... until all that remained was a hollow shell of rhetoric and ministerial meetings.

What matters most to the majority of Australians about the alliance with the US is the implicit pledge that America stands as Australia's defender-of-last-resort, should it face threats or attack it cannot cope with alone. It is vital that if New Zealand does embed its alliance busting anti-nuclear policy in legislation then the US indeed follow through and withdraw the

centerpiece of the security alliance with that country -- its defense guarantee. That way middle ground Labor politicians in Australia, like Prime Minister Hawke, and conservatives, will be vindicated, and the extreme left, for now, will remain contained. Moscow Radio's confident prediction on the morning after the New Zealanders' excluded the US warship, that it might "set off a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the ANZUS bloc" with the example of New Zealand "followed by Australia", will be disappointed.

Could New Zealand have been saved?

In retrospect perhaps New Zealand could have been kept within the western alliance -- if the US had made it much clearer, much earlier, to New Zealanders that they had a hard choice to make. The point was made too late: after the Labour Party had got itself deeply committed to the anti-nuclear policy. Indeed it was left until the Labour Government actually announced its policy. National pride had become engaged and it would have been too demeaning for the Government to back down. Mr Lange thought when he came to power that he did not have to make a hard choice between the nuclear policy and the alliance, and that he could have enough of each to satisfy both the activist left and the pro-ANZUS 60 percent of the New Zealand electorate.

Unprofessional, over-timid or insufficiently perceptive US diplomats may have been a problem with their professional predilection for surface harmony and temporary compromises, constantly postponing a necessary showdown. Maybe they talked too much to government officials, not enough to the then Labour opposition or to the New Zealand public. Maybe they were not candid enough, intimidated by fear of possible charges "interfering in domestic politics". That's exactly what they have to do in such circumstances: participate in the local political debate, when the locals discuss relations with the US.

The US would be in far better shape now in the south Pacific if it had taken a higher profile against the nuclear free zone treaty. US diplomats for ten years have trickily avoided any discussion of the merits and demerits of the treaty, while quietly lobbying behind the scenes for the "transit" clause for nuclear warships. They succeeded. Australia looked after America and got the transit clause in the treaty. In purely legalistic terms, US interests are protected. But in political terms the US has lost mightily. The opportunity was passed up to forthrightly proclaim the rightness of the nuclear deterrence policy and explain the danger of non-nuclear zones. America's tricky and timid Pacific diplomats have saddled the western alliance with that logically and morally indefensible little "out" in the SPNFZT allowing warship transit. Expediency and avoidance of public argument have allowed the main principles of unilateralism to triumph unchallenged in the public debate in the region.

Another emerging American problem is Australia's proposed "R & R", its retrenchment and retreat, as laid out quite unequivocally in the Dibb report. As the Australian Defence Minister, Mr Beazley told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, there is already some American disquiet. But so far it is a very quiet disquiet.

The Australian Government has not fully declared itself on these radical proposals, which threaten to seriously undermine the Australian-American alliance (and Australian defense as well). Before the Australian Government firms up its position on Dibb's proposals, American policymakers need to study them carefully, and then talk candidly and publicly about their implications for relations with the US.

Better perhaps to have some blunt public words exchanged now, than later when it is too late?

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STREET JOURNAL, MONDAY, JULY 7, 1986

Asian Wall St Journal Toward Another ANZUS Rift? HK

By PETER SAMUEL

Little New Zealand is known in America as an errant ally. That's because of the public split between the Lange Labor government and the U.S. over New Zealand's refusal to allow U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons or using nuclear fuel to stop at its ports. But there's a far more serious alliance problem developing with Australia.

Unlike the dispute with New Zealand, which focuses on a single issue, the American problem with Australia is based on several differences, some not dangerous by themselves, others potentially very troublesome. If the U.S. and New Zealand can be said to be having a fiery divorce, then the U.S. and Australia are quietly drifting apart.

Australians have traditionally fought with Americans in war. They fought in Korea and Vietnam, and in both world wars. Throughout its history, Australian defense policy has been based on the assumption that its fate is inextricably bound with that of the broader Western community.

No more. In the name of self-reliance, Australia is moving toward a concept of an "independent" defense force that is at odds with its established role in joint operations with the U.S. and allies in the Pacific. Michael O'Connor, president of the Australian Defense Association, has written that Australia's new defense policy is so out of line with American interests that it "constitutes a de facto withdrawal from ANZUS," the defense alliance among the U.S., Australia and New Zealand.

A Complacent View

At a time when the U.S. is asking its prosperous, stable allies to do more for their own and regional defense, Australia is cutting its defense force capabilities and declaring that it will not provide defense assistance (derided as "intervention") beyond Papua New Guinea and its own island possessions of Cocos and Norfolk. It is deliberately forswearing a regional role, and is discarding long-established cooperative arrangements with nearby Southeast Asian countries (especially Singapore and Malaysia) and the South Pacific.

This change is reflected in a report to Parliament last month by Defense Department consultant Paul Dibb. The report asserts a complacent view of Australia's defense needs. In its statement that "Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world.... We would receive at least 10 years' warning of a substantial military threat."

Even more disturbing is the Dibb report's extremely limited view of Australia's role in the defense alliance. Joint U.S.-Australian communications facilities and permission for visits of U.S. warships and B-52s "are a sufficient tangible contribution to the alliance," it says. Furthermore, the report assumes that the U.S. alone will contain the Soviets and that Australia need not continue to shape its forces for joint operations with the U.S. "There is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning," it says.

Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley stated the same view in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in May. "We want to focus on activities relevant to our national defense, while the U.S. wants to encourage us to do more in support of our common interest in deterrence of the U.S.S.R.," he said.

Mr. Beazley asserted a continuing Australian interest in strategic developments in Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific, but said Australia "would not, however, maintain defense capabilities sufficient to enable us to project decisive military power in all parts of that region." Australian defense capabilities are to be limited, he said, to "our area of direct military interest, which extends in rough terms out to about 1,000 nautical miles."

Australia is deliberately forswearing a regional role in defense, and is discarding long-established cooperative arrangements with nearby Southeast Asian countries and the South Pacific.

Australian defense spending has fallen below 3% of gross national product and Mr. Beazley wants to keep it that way—though that is far below U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization levels. Modest but versatile aircraft carriers and amphibious units have been abandoned and the number of frigate/destroyers is scheduled to decline from 13 to 9 through attrition. F-111 strike bombers will be denied a needed upgrade, meaning that the country will lose a strike force of considerable deterrent value. The Australian army—the doughty "diggers" of international fame at Gallipoli, Verdun and on the Kokoda Trail—are to suffer most drastically if plans go through to mothball most of their armor and artillery. The army will be reduced to a light mobile militia trained to thwart terrorist or guerrilla skirmishes.

Other aspects of the Australian drift away from the U.S. are:

- A belittling of the significance of the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific, and the repetition of the defense-enfeebling idea that there are "no threats" to Australia.

- Australia's strong line against several key elements of U.S. strategic policy, in particular the Strategic Defense Initiative and nuclear-weapons testing. Canberra has barred cooperation in SDI research and said that no U.S. satellite ground stations in Australia may be used in its support. In the United Nations and elsewhere, Australian representatives regularly call for an immediate, comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Australia has also joined the movement for a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

- The Hawke government has emphatically ruled out any new U.S. bases in Australia, though America would be hard pressed to project forces in the region if its Philippine bases are lost. Australia is the only country in the South Pacific that now has a comparable industrial infrastructure for U.S. air and naval forces. The tiny island alternatives of Diego Garcia, Guam, Tinian and Saipan are highly vulnerable.

- U.S. Navy ship visits to Australia have declined sharply from 73 in 1982 to 55 in 1985 with a further steep fall predicted this year. The Australian defense minister has reportedly asked for fewer visits.

A New Nationalism

- Australia has said a proposed U.S. Navy fuel storage depot in Western Australia for Indian Ocean operations will be accessible only for routine peacetime operations, though its main usefulness to the U.S. would be in emergencies.

- Australia is giving decreasing political support to U.S. policies and has fallen to 15th place on the U.S. State Department's list of allies ranked by coincidence of voting at the U.N. General Assembly. In 1985 Australia voted with the U.S. in only 60.2% of votes, compared to Israel with 91.5%, Britain with 88.6%, West Germany with 84.4%, France with 82.7% and Italy with 81.9%.

What's behind the drift apart? Those trying to distance Australia from the U.S. are activist factions within the ruling Labor Party based in the labor unions, universities, churches and the media. But other forces are also at work. One is a new Australian nationalism that manifests itself in sentiments against too-close relations with even a friendly superpower. The U.S. and its foreign policy also receive bad press in Australia, some of which is encouraged by the fear-mongering of a powerful local "peace" movement. And, as in other Western countries, a generation of Australians who lived through World War II and recall the joint fight against the Japanese is passing.

The U.S. alliance with Australia is not suddenly going bad and no dramatic break seems likely. But the drift apart is unmistakable. The Australian government naturally wants to manage the problem with quiet diplomacy. For its part, the U.S. must react with some diplomatic subtlety. At the same time, however, it must make its interpretation of the defense alliance clearer to the Australian public, the majority of which favors close ties with the U.S.

The break between the U.S. and New Zealand occurred in part because candid talk about developing differences was left until too late. The U.S. needs to look carefully at the current direction of Australian defense policy, making sure the New Zealand episode isn't repeated. Some official candor might well stop the rot.

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Mr. Wick Goes to Moscow

—Peter Samuel—

IN ONE of his classic works *Leftwing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, Lenin berated dogmatic comrades who maintained an unremitting hostility to the bourgeois enemy. It was necessary for tactical reasons, he wrote, to “master all forms” of political warfare and to “adapt our tactics.” Those who objected to “tacking, conciliatory maneuvers, or compromising” were guilty of a “left doctrinairism” which was “causing great prejudice to Communism.” It became the essence of Leninism that the Party should be ideologically flexible in tactics. Under the guise of a united front, it would befriend the many, temporarily, to isolate and defeat the few over time. Different faces would be shown—sometimes the snarling face of ruthlessness to intimidate (recently KAL007, Afghanistan), other times the smiling face of sweet reasonableness to lull (Gorbachev at Geneva). Soviet leaders like Stalin and Khrushchev were capable of considerable personal charm and sociability, and also of enormous, boorish nastiness. The system apparently teaches them the utility of the good cop, bad cop routine.

In recent months we have been seeing mostly the good cop, what with the so-called Spirit of Geneva and the 15-year plan for phasing out all nuclear weapons that was announced mid-January. But there are signs that some people in high places are getting carried away by the smiling face being worn at present

by the Soviets—for example the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Charles Wick.

One might hope that a propaganda chief of all people would look past the smile and ask whether the “Spirit of Geneva” has fundamentally altered the Soviet-American relationship. Mr. Wick, however, talks as though there has been a fundamental change, though he gives evidence only of new atmospherics. At his January 23 press conference in Washington, after his return from the Soviet Union, he opened by saying: “I bring you good news from Moscow. Our meetings [with the Soviets] were in the true spirit of Geneva. They were frank, they were open and I believe they will be very fruitful. The Russian leaders were warm, hospitable and very cooperative. I could not be more pleased. . . . I thank them for that and I could not be more optimistic. . . . All of our discussions in the Soviet Union were marked by the particular realization that, from the very top down, this was the watchword: ‘Let’s make it work.’ ”

Now, it is almost certainly true that the Soviets do want a resumption of the person-to-person exchanges that occurred during detente. No doubt they would like a return to the scale of scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges that prevailed through most of the 1970s. After all, those exchanges enabled the Soviets to gain access to American technology and government. We have learned, for instance, that the Soviets in the 1970s prepared for the large-scale theft of American high technology, which they have managed to incorporate into their aircraft and missiles, saving them vast

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research and development expenditures. Sporting teams and tourist visits apparently offered wonderful opportunities for *Spetsnaz* special forces soldiers to reconnoiter enemy territory. The 'detente' of the 1970s was accompanied by criticism of an 'inordinate fear of communism' and saw U.S. security and intelligence standards drastically loosened and downgraded—enabling the Soviets to build a network of agents in the U.S. government, of whom the Walkers, Pelton, and Chin may be only the tip of the iceberg. The Soviets must have been highly disturbed by the last five years of increasing security consciousness and their decreased access to American science and government. What better way to restore the 1970s free ride into America than a "Spirit of Geneva" and the resumption of scientific, cultural, and sporting exchanges? One need not doubt their "sincerity" and their "cooperative" attitudes in this endeavor.

MR. WICK at his press conference revived another old detentist delusion when he commented that "cold war rhetoric, distortions, misunderstandings, unseemly allegations and the like have contributed to international tensions and those tensions . . . could be reduced by wider contact between the people of both countries." The USIA chief has it wrong. During a decade of detente in the 1970s (in which the U.S. showed rhetorical forbearance, with talk of the North-South problem displacing discussion of the East-West problem), the West suffered terrible setbacks in its rivalry with the Soviets—Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Iran spring to mind for starters. That happened in large part because of the abandonment of what Mr. Wick, sounding like an Anthony Lewis or a Mary McGrory, chooses to call "cold war rhetoric." If the leaders of the country cease talking of the Soviet Union as an inherently expansionist, aggressive regime liable to take advantage of any weakness to extend the communist system, then the domestic political basis for a strong defense effort and for assistance to embattled friends is completely undermined. If the Soviets are truly rather

reasonable people with whom we can live peacefully only by rhetorical forbearance and greater efforts at understanding, why should we Western taxpayers make the sacrifices involved in high defense budgets or get in the messy business of supporting freedom fighters battling Soviet proxies?

Mr. Wick has a boss who aptly described the Soviets in 1981 as the "focus of evil" in the world; perhaps the USIA chief now considers this an "unseemly allegation." President Reagan was no doubt thinking of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, the Soviet role in systematically promoting terrorism, their unparalleled nuclear and conventional military build-up, their cruel persecution of dissidents, their gulags, and their development of fiendish new chemical and biological weapons . . . when he uttered an allegation so unseemly.

One can scarcely blame the Soviets for wanting our leaders to desist from candid, principled, and clear-sighted descriptions of what they are about, and for saying that such candor is destructive of relations—they know that such statements are liable to mobilize resistance to their international expansions. Thus in the early 1980s when Mr. Reagan was candidly characterizing the Soviets as an Evil Empire, U.S. defense expenditure was rising strongly; in the new spirit of Geneva summitry, it has peaked and may now be turning downward.

Soviet power in the world stands to be greatly enhanced by a less vivid and focused American perception of the Soviet threat, hence their fervid efforts to stop ABC from making the "Amerika" mini-series and to discourage Hollywood from making films whose heroes are American patriots battling nasty, duplicitous communists. The patriotism and conservatism of the young generation of Americans is surely profoundly unsettling to the Soviet leadership, and they need to put as many dampers on it as possible.

At his press conference Mr. Wick also said: "The exciting thing about this [exchanges] agreement is that it will promote the kind of understanding and mutual trust in their people and in our people, hopefully, on which can be built a genuine foundation for genuine arms

control. When peoples understand each other, the governments cannot be far behind."

Americans do not distrust Russians as people nor vice-versa. The mistrust, Mr. Wick, is mistrust of the Soviet government: for its professions of peaceful intent while building the world's most fearsome military machine, for proposing new arms control treaties while flagrantly violating the existing treaties, for signing the Helsinki agreement on human rights and

treating it with contempt, for underwriting and encouraging terrorists throughout the non-communist world, for bankrolling military build-ups in such remote places from Moscow as Angola and Nicaragua.

It is a very strange kind of understanding of the Soviet Union that Mr. Wick is promoting when he suggests that the Soviet government is as responsive as the U.S. government to the mood of its people.

Underestimating Mengistu

Paul B. Henze's article "The Dilemmas of the Horn" (Winter 1985/6) should be viewed as a welcome contribution to an under-analysed area-study. However, it is difficult to reconcile the thrust of his argument with his conclusion. For instance, Henze points out that the Ethiopian regime and their Soviet sponsors preside over one of the most brutal systems of government in the world. Yet, he then insists that, given the disgust of the Ethiopians with their rulers, they will inevitably "loosen" themselves from the regime in order to realize their considerable potential.

Unfortunately, as the tortured history of our era demonstrates, regimes such as Mr. Mengistu's do not evolve benignly into a more desirable form. Ethiopia is not Egypt. Unlike Sadat, Mengistu cannot simply request that the Soviets depart. The Soviets have imposed

a full-blown Marxist Leninist model, of which the gruesome consequences of collectivized agriculture are but one feature. Where these models prevail elsewhere in the world, neither a change in the indigenous leadership, as in the case of South Yemen, nor the ill-will of the population have led to the type of outcome Mr. Henze envisages. Indeed, totalitarian systems are removed only by force. This is the principle behind the exertions of anti-Soviet national liberation movements from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.

Yet, as the experience of these states suggests, the ability of a totalitarian regime to maintain power should not be underestimated. While one may hope that the Ethiopian case will be different, the behavior of its rulers provides little basis for optimism.


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THE TROUBLED WATERS OF ANZUS

PETER SAMUEL and BRIGADIER F. P. SERONG



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IN BRIEF

The dispute between the United States and New Zealand over U.S. nuclear ship visits — within the wider context of the Lange Government's antinuclear policies and anti-U.S. stance — has shaken the ANZUS Alliance to its foundations. The policies and attitudes in Wellington are symptomatic of a more general and progressive narrowing of national perspectives in New Zealand — and a disposition not to recognize any real threats on regional horizons except the abstract danger of nuclear war. Those trends are prevalent in Australia as well, even though they have not yet impinged as deeply on governmental policies. Notwithstanding justifiable impatience and frustration in Washington, the United States, in deference to its significant interests in the region, should not allow ANZUS to collapse. The alternative, rather, is to build around ANZUS a new alliance structure based on bilateral relationships and arrangements — a structure that might even be widened to include some of the small, but strategically important, South Pacific states.

In late 1985 the New Zealand Labor Government introduced into that country's parliament a Nuclear Free Zone bill, which its other two partners in ANZUS, Australia and the United States, fear could be a mortal blow against this thirty-five-year-old security alliance. The U.S. Government has stated that it will be forced to "review" its security obligations to New Zealand under the Alliance if that country enacts into law the antinuclear policies it has implemented since its accession to power in June 1984. U.S. of-

ficials have warned that the "review" would probably lead to the termination of U.S. defense commitments to New Zealand.

The alliance crisis came to American public attention in January 1985, when Labor Prime Minister David Lange announced that his Cabinet was rejecting a U.S. application for a port visit by the destroyer USS *Buchanan*, following planned naval exercises of the three ANZUS countries. The United States called off the exercises, and none has been held since with New Zealand forces. Intelligence ex-

changes were curtailed, New Zealand has been described as a "non-participating member" of the alliance, and the annual meeting of the ministerial-level ANZUS Council — the main political manifestation of the alliance — was cancelled last year, and none is currently scheduled for 1986.

The crisis in one of America's oldest defense alliances flared after long efforts by diplomats to find ways of reconciling the Wellington Government's domestic political needs with the U.S. Navy's security requirements. The cuts in ANZUS ties were designed, U.S. officials said, to demonstrate to New Zealanders the seriousness with which Washington viewed the antinuclear policy that was being adopted. The danger was clear as well that if Washington appeased an antinuclear "peace" lobby in New Zealand, it would quickly face similar pressures for nuclear weapon exclusion from such groups in Japan, Australia and Western Europe; thus the dispute took on a global significance.

At the same time the United States evidently was striving to exercise restraint, lest over-assertiveness would fan anti-American sentiment in New Zealand even more. Clearly there is reluctance in Washington to countenance the collapse of an alliance that is a major purveyor of America's security interests in the vast arena of the Pacific Basin and the Indian Ocean.

Still, there can be no blinking the depth of the dispute. The Nuclear Free Zone bill now before the Parliament in Wellington is described as "an Act to establish in New Zealand a nuclear free zone" and contains the following clause: "The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device. . . ." Since most of its warships are capable of carrying nuclear weapons (most of which are tactical anti-submarine or anti-ship warheads), the U.S. Navy cannot comply with a nonnuclear policy without compromising its universal "neither-confirm-nor-deny" security policy on the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships.

Differing Global Perspectives

It is a constantly iterated theme of the Lange Labor Government in New Zealand that "we

don't have enemies. We aren't threatened." Shortly after his Government's refusal to admit the USS *Buchanan* to a New Zealand harbor, Prime Minister David Lange bluntly conveyed the theme to an American audience in Los Angeles: "New Zealand itself is a country which does not face an external threat."²

Although Australian governments have not been quite as blithely complacent in their pronouncements, nevertheless the view of a regional environment unruffled by foreseeable threats has become commonplace in that country as well. The fact that this serene crystal ball is by no means the exclusive property of left-liberal opinion in Australia is brought out by the following statement by the conservative newsweekly, *The Bulletin*, in a recent review of the ANZUS Treaty: "There is no threat which the [ANZUS] alliance addresses. There is practically no Soviet interest in the region, and certainly no Soviet threat to Australia."³

Indeed, the few Australian observers who perceive dangers on the horizon tend to be dismissed derisively as "threat experts." If a mainstream Australian or New Zealander is inclined to discuss a threat, he is likely to find it in "nuclear weapons" or "the arms race" rather than in Soviet foreign policy. The Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Stuart Harris, in a recent review of Australia's foreign policy, made virtually no mention of the Soviet Union, but devoted much space to the evils of apartheid in South Africa and summed up his global perspective with the phrase: "Our overriding concern is the threat of nuclear war."⁴

It is this view in Australia and New Zealand of a relatively cloud-free international environment — aside from the abstract specter of the mushroom cloud — that represents the fundamental corrosive in the ANZUS Alliance. That view clashes starkly with what any observer of the U.S. scene must still perceive as a basic American consensus on the fact of a threat emanating from the Soviet Union — a threat that inheres in the amassment of Soviet military power, in the steadily expanding reach of that power on a global scale, and in the demonstrated willingness by Moscow to exercise those military muscles in the pursuit of the Soviet Union's global interests — even if that exercise is prudently calculated to eschew a direct military confrontation of the United States in the current phase of the

global competition. There is continuing debate in the United States about the true ramifications of this threat and in particular about how best to cope with it — whether by confrontation or negotiated arms control — but not about its reality.

These differences in global perspectives may be overdrawn. Nevertheless, there is little question that they not only underlie such manifestations as the dispute over U.S. ship visits to New Zealand, but also sponsor an erosion of the sense of urgency and importance of nurturing the alliance itself. The newly appointed Australian Ambassador to the United States has expressed the view that major differences of opinion with the United States on such matters as arms control, strategic modernization, the Strategic Defense Initiative and nuclear testing not only are not of great import, but represent a healthy reflection of the "pluralism" of the Western Alliance. New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer offered similar sentiments during his September 1985 visit to the United States.

A general complacency about the threat environment logically leads to complacency about the alliance with the United States and, consciously or not, its lowered priority relative to other issues. It explains why politicians in Australia and New Zealand are regularly prepared to allow the fabric of the alliance to be stretched by indulging the "deep concerns" of antinuclear factions for pure gesturing against these weapons.

The Issue of the French Nuclear Tests

The French nuclear tests in the Pacific have long and regularly promoted political passion in New Zealand and Australia. The heat of that passion is singularly unrelated to the objective facts, particularly those bearing on the issue of alleged health hazards flowing from the tests. There has never been any radioactive leakage from the tests. The explosions are conducted underground and at extremely remote distances from the scenes of protest — 2,500 miles from New Zealand and nearly 4,000 miles from the closest part of Australia. While France may be a sometime abrasive member of the Western Alliance, two decades after the fact her status as a nuclear power is no longer a matter of controversy — nor is her legitimate sovereign right, as well as practical imperative, to test and modernize the where-

The Troubled Waters of ANZUS

withal of that status. Yet, "down under" the French tests are the target of constant and polemical derision.

New Zealand governments in particular, by their attacks on the French over a decade, have done much to fan the antinuclear emotion.⁵ In 1973 the earlier Labor Government headed by Norman Kirk actually sent a small New Zealand Navy warship close to the nuclear test zone in Tahiti, with a cabinet minister aboard — perhaps the only time in history that a government has directly joined an ostensibly "popular protest" against another country. Such actions and continuing pronouncements from Wellington obviously have done much to legitimize and broaden the antinuclear movement in New Zealand, which is now redounding to the detriment of the United States and its relations with a longtime ally.

Rewriting the History of ANZUS

Wallace Rowling, the New Zealand Ambassador to the United States and himself a former Labor Prime Minister, in his speeches and many letters to newspapers and journals has been reminding Americans that his country has been alongside the United States in all of the latter's conflicts in this century and has played a constructive defense role in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Those reminders are correct, as is the Ambassador's contention that the alliance with the United States continues to enjoy overwhelming popular support in New Zealand.⁶

The fact of that popular majority, "silent" or not, documents the alliance's abidingly solid place at the "grass-roots" level. Yet, the pro-alliance element in the electorate also has adverse ramifications by encouraging duplicity on the part of politicians who do not really share that sentiment. Thus, a leader like Lange feels compelled to defer to pro-alliance opinion by going through the motions of ostensible "compromise" with the United States. When such gestures fail — as did the September 1985 mission by New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer — the officials concerned have an acute political need to paint the United States as intransigent and unreasonable, thereby compounding the damage to the American image.

New Zealand spokesmen also feel compelled to rewrite the history of ANZUS in an attempt to justify their stance against nuclear ship

visits — notably in their claim that the ANZUS Alliance has always been somehow nonnuclear in character. New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States has written: "New Zealand has never formed part of a nuclear strategy. We have not asked nor do we expect to be defended by nuclear weapons. From our perspective, ANZUS has always been a conventional defense partnership."

The contention amounts to a distortion of history. The historical fact is that ANZUS was formed in the wake of America's having saved Australia and New Zealand from occupation by the Japanese Imperial Army and having invoked its military might — and ultimately the atomic bomb — in defeating Japan. The nuclear fires of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the very crucible of which ANZUS was cast. The postwar years in which ANZUS was conceived were a period in which threats were vividly perceived by Australians and New Zealanders, and when American nuclear weapons comprised the principal shield against those threats.

For a time after the war, when its wounds still rankled, Australians and New Zealanders, in pursuing a formal security treaty with the United States, were obsessed with a vision of a rearmaged Japan. This trepidation then was joined by fear of the "downward thrust of communism" — to quote one of the more memorable phrases of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies. New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser, just before the formation of ANZUS, spoke of the "dark, turgid, dangerous flood" which had submerged Burma, Malaya and Indonesia in "terrorism and murder and the tyranny of gangsters."

In short, Australians and New Zealanders desired ANZUS precisely because it brought with it the "nuclear umbrella" (a positive phrase then). There never was any serious questioning in that earlier period of the proposition that U.S. nuclear weapons were to be used to keep the peace and, in the event of war, be used to win it. With Australian and New Zealand approval, the United States, Britain and France tested nuclear weapons in huge atmospheric experiments in the South Pacific throughout the formative period of ANZUS. For some years before and after 1951, when ANZUS was signed, nuclear weapons were exploded in the Australian desert, and new missiles were tested at the Woomera rocket range in South Australia.

American nuclear power was precisely what made the alliance attractive to Australia and New Zealand. In light of this vivid history, the current New Zealand Government's suggestion that the United States is somehow trying to turn a nonnuclear alliance into a nuclear one represents an inversion of the facts. It is more accurate to posit that the Lange Government is endeavoring to denuclearize a treaty that always has had America's nuclear capabilities at its very heart.

The Policies of Unilateralism

Moreover, neither denials nor obfuscations can mask the essentially "unilateralist" character of the policies and actions of the New Zealand Government — at least as far as their portent and impact are concerned. New Zealand's policies of harrassing the French nuclear tests and excluding American nuclear warships that have visited for over three decades are setting the stage for a potential strategic windfall for the Soviet Union. Those policies harm only Western defense capabilities and disrupt established Western defense arrangements, while imposing no cost whatsoever on Moscow. The Lange Government contends that it is taking a "stand" against nuclear weapons. Yet, the only nuclear weapons that are thus being opposed and embargoed are those of the West. The action is pure unilateralism.

Equally unilateralist, as well as illusory, is the claim by the Lange Government that the demarcation of a "nuclear free zone" will somehow enhance the region's security. Discerning an attenuation of Western power in the South Pacific, the Soviets already are directing spearheads of influence into the area. There has been a sudden flurry of Soviet efforts to cultivate relations with the various Pacific island states, and they are meeting with some success, as is evidenced by the conclusion of a major fishing agreement between the Soviet Union and the island state of Kiribati. It is by now an established pattern of Soviet strategy that such agreements represent the opening wedges for Soviet political influence and ultimate strategic presence.

It is also an established fact that Australian communist trade union organizers have long been active in radicalizing local labor unions, and "liberation theologians" have heavily penetrated the churches of the region.⁸ It must

be kept in mind that these island states represent tiny communities — in many cases hardly more than extended tribes — and no great resources are needed for outsiders to exert influence. Against this background, it does not tax the imagination to envision the possible emergence of a "Pacific Grenada."

The salients of Soviet strategy in the South Pacific are clear. The near-term objective is to seize every opportunity to frustrate and disrupt the U.S. maritime communications net. The longer-term objective is to obtain bases in the South Pacific to extend the range of the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet — already the largest in the Soviet Order of Battle, and most particularly the largest in attack submarines and long-range bombers. No longer confined to the Sea of Japan, the Soviets have access to Camranh Bay in Vietnam, and they seek bases farther south from which to counter the U.S. oceanic strategy.

The Fundamental Issue in Ship Visits

There is another and more direct sense in which policies of the Lange Government carry a unilateralist color. Given their time-honored contempt for the ethics of bourgeois governments, the Soviets are not likely to be inhibited, for their part, by local injunctions against the intrusion of nuclear weapons. Thus, the captains of visiting Soviet warships will undoubtedly offer assurances that their vessels carry no nuclear weapons, and of their solemn intent to comply with local laws and policies in this respect, irrespective of the fact of such weapons on board. American military commanders and diplomats, by contrast, must maintain a public posture of awkward evasiveness about nuclear weapons in deference to the "neither-confirm-nor-deny" doctrine. That evasiveness will always lose in a political contest against outright Soviet prevarication — especially in circumstances when the Soviets know that the prevarication will not be exposed short of the below-decks inspection which they will never permit.

The ship-visits dispute between New Zealand and the United States has been cast in terms of finding a way to reconcile Wellington's "no-nukes" policy with Washington's "neither-confirm-nor-deny" stance on the positioning of nuclear weaponry. New Zealand officials have suggested that they do not demand that the United States overtly discard the

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"neither-confirm-nor-deny" rule — that they will make the determination of whether U.S. warships proposed for visits to New Zealand harbors conform with their "no-nukes policy," and that they will not insist upon any physical inspection.⁹ This is said to be a formula that has been applied in such other restrictive countries as Japan, Norway and Denmark. There was almost a consensus in New Zealand media comment that this formula offered a solution to the dispute.

Yet, this line of "solution" already has been negated in its practical application. In January 1985, when the U.S. State Department formally asked Wellington for a permit for a port visit by the USS *Buchanan* in association with an ANZUS naval exercise, it did so in the belief that it had an understanding with the New Zealand Government whereby the latter would approve the port call, declaring on its own account that the warship was nonnuclear. Instead Prime Minister David Lange rejected the visit, averring that the USS *Buchanan* was "not able, given the level of our knowledge of it, to meet the criteria of our policy." He tried to cushion the rejection by suggesting that New Zealand welcomed another U.S. ship visit "as long as that vessel complies with our non-nuclear weapons policy."¹⁰

What apparently happened is that some New Zealand officials believed that they could use the Scandinavian-Japanese formula, and conveyed as much to the State Department. Meanwhile, however, skeptical journalists and the anti-American left of the New Zealand Labor Party put pressure on the Government, questioning its basis for knowing whether proposed ships were nonnuclear. The issue was so highly publicized and politicized that Mr. Lange and his cabinet decided to bar the ship visit rather than confront the combined forces of the left and the media.

Meanwhile, New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer has explicitly ruled out the formula. Following his unsuccessful mission to the United States, he asserted:

There are a number of countries with policies of one sort or another of that nature, Denmark, possibly Norway and also Japan. The way in which those policies operate would not, I am afraid, satisfy New Zealand public opinion. New Zealanders are direct and simple people, and they require as-

surance that the ship has not got a nuclear weapon on board. They are not able to overlook or wink at infractions of that policy, and for that reason I don't think any of the policies followed by any of the other countries would suit us. We are not, of course, asking the United States to breach its neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. We know it cannot do that. We are prepared to make the assessment for our own purposes — not in any physical way, I might add.¹¹

Lange Government officials have repeatedly insisted that the no-nuclear-weapons policy itself is "nonnegotiable," and they assert the importance of that policy in tones of moral righteousness. This has produced an atmosphere in New Zealand in which any U.S. warship visits are bound to be considered in conditions of intense political emotion engendered by media coverage and public discussion.

The nub of the problem is one not of procedures but of irreconcilable objectives. The New Zealand Labor Government does not want nuclear armed warships entering its harbors; the United States wants that right. The United States, having conducted the ANZUS Alliance for more than thirty years without restrictions on nuclear warship visits, wants to continue the visits on that basis. "We only have one navy; we do not have a nuclear navy and a nonnuclear navy," say U.S. officials.

The New Zealand Government has stated that the visit of tiny FFG-7 Perry class frigates will be welcome, presumably having judged that these vessels rarely carry nuclear weapons (although they obviously can deploy nuclear-armed depth charges). It is not surprising that the U.S. Administration will not accept this proposal. Frigates are a relatively insignificant class of warships, the smallest of surface combatants. The United States has traditionally sent destroyers, cruisers, submarines and other, more substantial warships to New Zealand, and wishes to be able to continue doing so in the context of its ultimate responsibilities to the Alliance.

U.S. officials have argued — and New Zealand officials have never really contested the argument — that the nonnuclear restrictions impose severe operational difficulties for the United States in fulfilling its treaty commitment to come to the defense of New

Zealand. That remote country can only be defended with warships. Those warships need to exercise regularly with New Zealand naval vessels, and they need to refuel and reprovise and to be able to give their crews the respite of shore-leave in New Zealand ports. New Zealand officials have never come to grips with the question of how the United States is supposed to maintain its operational relationship with the New Zealand Navy if only small frigates are permitted into its harbors.

Deeper Implications of the Dispute

Finally, there is the New Zealand Government's demand that it only be defended with nonnuclear weapons. This proposition is so astounding that one wonders whether it is meant seriously or uttered merely as part of the anti-nuclear rhetoric. For such a policy would extend to the Soviets an open invitation to invoke precisely the nuclear threat the New Zealanders say they want to avoid.

Let us assume for the sake of illustration that the United States agrees to what Wellington asks: henceforth the U.S. Navy agrees never to send nuclear armed ships into the vicinity of New Zealand, and not to deploy them to the defense of that country. The Soviets, by this time, have visiting rights for their "fishing" vessels, and their electronic intelligence-gathering is functioning fully. They carry on a range of "cultural exchanges," trading companies, shipping firms and a burgeoning embassy. Now they ask for warship visiting rights, and the New Zealand Government is reluctant. The Soviet Union uses its various covert "assets" to mount a major propaganda campaign on behalf of rights for the Soviet fleet equivalent to those of the U.S. fleet. Rejection of the Soviet demand is widely described as "provocative" and "unfriendly" to the Soviet Union. Soviet submarines and warships are increasingly reported off the coast of New Zealand. There is confusion and uncertainty about whether the Soviet warships are nuclear-armed, but the realists in New Zealand know that they almost certainly are. Under the shadow of Soviet nuclear weapons, Wellington accommodates to Moscow's demands.

In this scenario the Soviets have been emboldened to exert a threat of nuclear coercion against New Zealand by the knowledge that the U.S. Navy is effectively held at bay by the

nonnuclear restriction. Would Mr. Lange really expect the U.S. Navy to unload its nuclear warheads in Honolulu and steam to New Zealand's defense in confrontation with a nuclear-armed Soviet fleet?

It is doubtful that New Zealand officials have pondered even this sort of elementary crisis scenario, let alone the deeper implications of their policy course for their country's ultimate security. Clearly, the advocacy of such a course in Wellington reflects a luxury of politics against the backdrop of what is perceived as a "threat-free" environment. But what will happen to this (perceived) environment if the present course is continued?

The Alliance Stake in Australia

The ANZUS crisis shows more broadly that neutralist thinking is dangerously invading the realms of policy. As has already been noted, in both Australia and New Zealand neutralist language has become common, reflected in the constant use of phrases that suggest that the United States and USSR should be viewed on a similar plane. Thus, statements abound to the effect that "nuclear weapons" threaten the peace, and that "each superpower" should exercise "restraint."

The Australian Labor Government has not progressed as far along this neutralist road as its counterpart in New Zealand; it is considerably less confused about its national interest and less inclined to taking righteous stances. Nonetheless, on a whole range of important issues it has adopted a position opposed to the United States:

- It is adamantly against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), even in the latter's research phase, and has stopped formerly productive collaboration with the United States in electromagnetic railgun technology.
- It will not provide even simple logistic support for U.S. monitoring of MX tests into the Tasman Sea and does not support the U.S. strategic modernization program.
- It demands an immediate cessation of nuclear testing, regardless of the effect that this would have on the strategic balance.

Because it shares Eastern Siberia's longitude, Australia is the site for several extremely important U.S. communications stations. At Pine Gap in Central Australia is the major satellite ground station and processing

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center for electronic intelligence. At Nurrungar near Alice Springs is major support for infrared sensing satellites that detect and alert to Soviet missile launches, a key part of the American early warning system. And at North West Cape is a very low frequency radio station for communications with ballistic missile and attack submarines in the Indian Ocean.

Advances in communications technology may enable the United States to reduce somewhat its dependence on some of these Australian facilities in the future. The newest designs of infrared-equipped satellites for detection of missile launches reportedly incorporate some capacity for direct satellite-to-satellite communications, reducing the need for ground relay stations such as that at Nurrungar. Continental U.S.-based extremely low frequency radio systems, and satellite-based blue-green lasers that can penetrate sea water to some depth, will eventually reduce the need for submarine radio relay stations like North West Cape. But given the value of redundancy in maintaining communications, command and intelligence channels in time of war, the joint facilities in Australia will continue to be significant.

Australia, in economic size and population, is to New Zealand approximately what the United States is to Canada. With about 16 million population (to New Zealand's 3.4 million) Australia has a gross national product of around U.S. \$150 billion (New Zealand's GNP is \$20 billion), and Australia ranks ninth in the Western world, after the Group of Seven and Spain. It is the dominant supplier of industrial raw materials to Japan and the most important world supplier after the Soviet Union and South Africa of many scarce metals such as titanium and industrial diamonds.

Moreover, Australia's strategic significance is growing against the background of ascending crisis in the Philippines, and the shadow being cast by that crisis over the critical U.S. military facilities in Subic Bay and Clark Field. Guam and Tinian may be planned as immediate replacements for these facilities in the event of their loss. Clearly, however, Australia offers the potential of significant support to U.S. Pacific and Indian Ocean forces with its considerable transportation, economic and industrial infrastructure and its great continental depth. Even though the current political climate may militate against such a tightened

and more conspicuous U.S.-Australian security relationship, nevertheless the incipient winds of crisis and danger in the broader Pacific region may well bring a progressive resobering in Australian perceptions and policies. A formal collapse of ANZUS, in any event, would threaten to close the door to such enhanced ties. More will be said on this subject below.

The Option of Bilaterals

Prime Minister Lange proclaims that ANZUS continues to exist. The statement is correct because no member has yet invoked Clause 10 of the Treaty, which permits withdrawal after a twelve-months' notice. Meanwhile New Zealand, as an ANZUS partner, has been in effect quarantined within the Treaty organization, most particularly in the area of shared intelligence. By extension this isolation must eventually be felt in the areas of logistic support and shared training experience that is needed to maintain the state of the art of the common defense.

Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, recently retired Chief of the Australian Defence Force, has said, rightly, that the value of an alliance, and most certainly of this one, is less in its availability on D-Day than in the ongoing, day-to-day contacts which ensure that, in the hour of need, the partners can work together immediately in the closest operational effectiveness. He also mentioned the possibility of graduated pressure against New Zealand. This presumably would include the British notion of applying for the entry of Her Majesty's ships to New Zealand harbors.

Mr. Lange speaks of maintaining an operational ANZUS on a conventional equipment basis. We have already pointed out that the idea of turning ANZUS into a nonnuclear alliance is illusory in a strategic context. But it cannot be viable in any critical operational context as well. No one expects New Zealand or Australian forces to operate nuclear equipment. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the essential strategic support that would enable those forces to operate at all, anywhere, can only come from the U.S. forces which are irrevocably nuclear-configured.

Meanwhile, the alliance is thrown back essentially on bilateral relationships. True, this is no more than making the best of a bad situation, but it is a great deal better than permitting the relationships to disintegrate en-

tirely. Australia and the United States can maintain the thrust of their preexisting relationship, while Australia can work diligently to keep New Zealand "within reach" of rational alliance compromise until that country can sort out its tangled internal politics toward that end.

Let us at this point assume, in accordance with the New Zealand political calendar, that some eighteen months are available for this political sorting-out process in New Zealand. Can that time be used to present Mr. Lange with a new formula that he can sell to his electorate because it is new, even if it is not acceptable to his Labor Left (which will by that time have discredited itself)? His government faces election in mid-1987, although it could be brought on earlier at his discretion.

The ANZUS Treaty itself gives us the essential clue. In its preamble, and elsewhere in the text, it refers to ANZUS existing "pending the development of a more comprehensive system." Clearly ANZUS is transitional. Perhaps the time has come for the alliance, as it is now cast, to make way for something more appropriate: namely a broader, if also more differentiated, alliance network in the South Pacific.

The project would take time. There is no need to scrap the ANZUS Treaty as such, now or ever. The international archives are bulging with lapsed but unratified treaties, of which the Manila Pact is a recent example. ANZUS can continue to exist while its replacement is constructed. This would be a step-by-step building process. And for such a process, interlocking bilateral agreements offer the best and most expeditious building blocks: they can be molded to the different needs and capabilities of the partners.

In the process of construction, the newly conceived flexibility can be used to bring in other regional entities that can contribute to the common good. Thus, with New Zealand linked to Australia and the latter to the United States, the good offices of Australia and New Zealand might be exploited to offer association to the nations of the South Pacific Forum. The cords of such association would be logistic support and long-term extension of existing economic aid. Direct U.S. involvement in this process is not necessary, and perhaps not desirable at this juncture.

Australia itself is the best example of what

could be accomplished, militarily and logistically, with a fresh and flexible approach based on bilateral arrangements. Australia's budget problems have cut deeply into the very muscle of its military forces. Those forces are now in a condition where even essential training is no longer possible. The worldwide state of the military art is advancing, and Australia's military establishment is falling ever farther behind.

Much of this could be redressed through two major sinews of U.S.-Australian military cooperation: U.S. training assistance to Australian forces, combined with the possible prepositioning of U.S. equipment.

While it has no need of a large standing army, Australia requires large and strong reserves to allow a rapid buildup to a three-division force (from its less-than-one division strength), as proposed by Australia's leading defense commentator Michael O'Connor.¹² Australia and the United States might consider more ambitious cooperation than hitherto, by training reserve forces with U.S. equipment. Similarly, Australia could reestablish naval air skills through a program of attachment of reserve personnel to U.S. Navy carriers which base F-18 aircraft. Comparable arrangements might be made with the U.S. services to provide Australian forces with critically needed capabilities and skills of airborne early warning and aerial refuelling.

The possibility of prepositioning U.S. equipment in Australia for use by U.S. forces or Australian reserves might be pursued. The Australian Navy and Air Force are outfitted almost entirely with U.S.-made equipment. The problems of interoperability would be much greater in land forces, because the Australian Army has little familiarity with U.S. materiel.

It must be stressed again that such tightened bilateral U.S.-Australian sinews will require commensurate changes in current attitudes and policies in Canberra — particularly a revitalized Australian perception of regional defense requirements. Yet, those requirements are destined to loom ever larger in the emerg-

ing Pacific environment, and they are bound to make their imprint on political attitudes.

While the concept of bilateral arrangements outlined centers on Australia, it could be extended — with obvious variations in kind and in scale — to New Zealand and the small nations of the South Pacific. The broad concept promises a closer relationship of the South Pacific nations with the United States, and a much better equipped and better prepared regional defense structure. Most important, it would offer a completely new scenario for strategic negotiation within which those politicians committed to certain lines of action or inaction could be given room to maneuver and thus to extricate themselves from the corners into which they are now painted. Equally important, it is now apparent that consequent upon the current turmoil the region's governments will be progressively ready for such an invitation. They are already becoming profoundly concerned — and understandably so.

The Imperative of Patience

Meanwhile, the chagrin and impatience triggered in the United States by New Zealand's illogical and stubborn actions — particularly in the halls of the U.S. Congress — are comprehensible. Those emotions are exacerbated by growing, and equally comprehensible, American resentments more generally at allies who not only have forsaken gratitude for past assistance, but seem blinded to their own basic security needs.

Yet, history has proven impatience to be the worst counsellor of policy and statesmanship. Alliance structures, like all institutions erected by men, can be challenged by time, circumstances and human caprice — and they can be challenged to the core. Yet, rather than permitting them to collapse, thus forfeiting the field to uncertainty and to peril, the enlightened course is to build a new and more appropriate framework of security around them. This is the task that calls to the United States, Australia and a hopefully sobering government of New Zealand in the South Pacific.

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NOTES

1. "ANZUS and Ship Visits," article signed by Prime Minister David Lange written for the *Miami Herald* for syndication in the United States, February 26, 1985.
2. Speech at the Ambassador Hotel, Los Angeles, February 26, 1985.
3. John Edwards, "It's Goodbye ANZUS," *The Bulletin* (Sydney, Australia) July 16, 1985, p. 28.
4. Dr. Stuart Harris, "Australia's Foreign Policy," an Address to a Gathering of the Diplomatic Community in Canberra, June 27, 1985, published in Australian Department of Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, No. 488, July 24, 1985.
5. By way of example, Prime Minister Lange reacted publicly to President Mitterand's recent invitation to South Pacific nations to visit the nuclear test facilities by describing it as "an obscene gesture."
6. Asked "Are you in favor of, or against, New Zealand being a member of ANZUS," 78 per cent said "For" to 12 per cent "Against" in a McNair public opinion poll, February 18, 1985.
7. Letter to Representative Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Affairs Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 18, 1985.
8. Australian communist trade union organizers, liberation theology clerics and other left activists have been influential in moving local policies in a pro-Soviet direction. Libya and Cuba are showing increased interest in the region. In New Caledonia, French decolonization is complicated by an indigenous radical group with Libyan links. Cuba is heavily upgrading its operations in the South Pacific, hoping to use diplomatic status in Australia as a base.
9. Letter by Ambassador Rowling in *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 1985.
10. Prime Minister Lange in a post-Cabinet press conference, February 4, 1985.
11. Answer to question at "Statesman's Forum," Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 20, 1985.
12. Michael O'Connor, *To Live in Peace* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1985).

